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THE INDIVIDUAL WORKER IN GRIEVANCE
ARBITRATION: 'STILL ANOTHER LOOK
AT THE PROBLEM
By SANFORD J. RosEN*
This article is concerned with the rights to be enjoyed
by workers within collective bargaining processes, most
particularly in grievance arbitration. When his status is in-
volved in a grievance, should an individual be able to com-
pel arbitration? If the union has decided to go to arbitra-
tion, has the concerned individual the right to notice of and
presence at any hearing that is conducted? Has he the
rights to participate and to be represented by separate
counsel in the proceedings? Has he the right to challenge,
in a judicial proceeding, an arbitration award that he con-
siders to be adverse to his interests?
Investigation of these questions necessarily begins with
and is continuously permeated by consideration that must
be given to some of the basic questions involved in the
jurisprudence of labor law. That is, to discuss the rights
and status of the individual within arbitration meaning-
fully, it is necessary to contend with significant questions
concerning such matters as the relationship between the
worker and his union, and the character of collective bar-
gaining, of grievance procedures and of labor arbitration
processes. Furthermore, this exercise must be undertaken
with the understanding that:
"The problem presented is not one of choosing
theories, for we can draw from them only the contents
* AB., 1959, Cornell University; LL.B., 1962, Yale University; Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Author's Note:
I am indebted to the Editors of the Hastings Law Journal, who have been
kind enough to permit me to repeat portions of my earlier article, Fair
Representation, contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union
Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 Hastings L.J. 389
(1964). I also wish to acknowledge my debt to Professor Clyde W.
Summers of the Yale Law School for his many helpful comments and
criticisms when an earlier version of this article was submitted to him as
a seminar paper. The views expressed, however, are not attributable to
him and he bears no responsibility for the result.
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which we have placed in them. The problem is one of
policy - what rights should an individual have under
a collective agreement? This problem is rooted in the
need for reconciling the interests of the individual with
the collective interests of the union and management."'
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS GOVERNMENT
Collective bargaining is the accepted means by which
employer-employee relations are organized in the United
States. In collective bargaining, management negotiates
with the employees, collectively represented by a union of
their choosing, for the purpose of determining the condi-
tions of employment that are to prevail and the structure
of future collective relations. The process is continuous
and encompasses both contract formation and contract im-
plementation stages.2 The formal agreement that is negoti-
ated, however, is rather like an industrial constitution or
basic statute,3 while the grievance and arbitration pro-
cedures, established in that agreement to assure peaceful
relations during its term, constitute a kind of administra-
tive process.4 Although these are rough analogies and the
distinction between negotiation and administration cannot
be finely drawn,5 use of these analogies compels recognition
of that which by now should be abundantly clear - within
the legal limitations maintained by the general political
community,6 the collective bargaining process is vitally con-
'Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary
Analysis, 12 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. LAb. 63, 66 (1959), reprinted in 9 BuFFALO
L. REV. 239, 241 (1960) (henceforth only the BUFFALO citation will be
given) ; see Report of the Committee on State Labor Legislation, A.B.A.
Section of Labor Relations Law 164, 165-66 (1963).
2 See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957).
See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 300 (Cambridge 10th ed. 1958),
revised problem 6A (1962, on file at the Harvard Law Library) 6-7; Oox,
The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 152 (1957) ; Dunau,
Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining,
50 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 732 (1950) ; Givens, Federal Protection of Employee
Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 259, 273 (1960) ; Shul-
man, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAEV. L. REv. 999,
1002-04 (1955) ; Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice
Through the Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 24 (1952).
See HART & SACKS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 300, rev. prolb. at 6-7; Dunau,
supra note 3, at 732-33; Shulman, supra note 3, at 1007; Summers, supra
note 3, at 24.
5 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957) ; Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 351 (19G4) (Goldberg, J. concurring) ; Wellington, Union
Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal
System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1340-41 (1958).
6 See The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§
153, 158-60 (Supp. IV, 1963) (henceforth NLRA). The Labor Management
234
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cerned with the establishment, legitimization and conti-
nuity of systems of industrial self-government.7
On its first level, this private governing process is con-
cerned with group relations, for it is within the broad
framework of collective bargaining that the apparently
conflicting interests of union and management, themselves
petit private governments, 8 are institutionally accommo-
dated.9 But collective bargaining obviously is also con-
cerned with the economic government of individuals, for
ultimately it is the rights of the workers, incident to their
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 186-87 (Supp.
IV, 1963) (henceforth LMRA). The Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577
(1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-87 (1958). See also The Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 Stat.
519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV, 1963) (henceforth LMRDA).
7 See HART & SACKS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 300, rev. prob. at 6-7; KUHN,
BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT: THE POWER OF INDUSTRIAL WORK
GROUPs 1 (1961) ; SLICHTER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT
1 (1941) ; Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1491-93 (1959); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963
Wis. L. REV. 3 (1963), also published in NEw HORIZONS FOE LABOR ARBITRA-
TION, Fifteenth Annual Meeting National Academy of Arbitrators (Kahn
ed. 1962) 8 (henceforth cited to 1963 Wis. L. REV. only) ; Givens, Comment,
in SYmPOSiUm ON LABoR RELATIONS LAW 76 (Slovenko ed. 1961) ; Hanslowe,
On the Need for a Political Science of Collective Bargaining, in SYMPOSIUM
ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 59 (Slovenko ed. 1961) ; Shulman, supra note 3,
at 1002-03; Summers, supra note 3, at 24; Summers, Individual Rights in
Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362, 389-90 (1962) ;
Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration in THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES,
Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbi-
trators 1, 5 (McKelvey ed. 1958) ; cf. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining
and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 829, 845-46 (1948) ; contra,
Burstein, Status of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2 LAB. L.J. 902,
906 (1951). A recent examination of the "governmental" and other some-
whait related theories of collective bargaining is to be found in Nally, The
Grievance Procedure and the Supreme Court: A Theory of Collective Bar-
gaining, 8 VILL. L. REV. 177 (Winter 1962-63).
1 See GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS 163-95 (1960); MILLER, PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1959) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) ; see also Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ;
HACKER, POLrTICS AND THE CORPORATION (1958); LmsERsON, AMERICAN
TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 3-16 (1959) ; Berle, Constitutional Limitations on
Corporate Activity - Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through
Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952) ; Blumrosen, The Worker
and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the
Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435 (1963) ; Cox, Rights
Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 626-27 (1956) ; Friedmann,
Corporate Power, Government By Private Groups and the Law, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 155 (1957) ; Givens, supra note 3, at 270; Hanslowe, supra note 7,
at 62; Summers, Union Power and Workers' Rights, 49 MICH. L. REV. 805,
815-16 (1951); Wirtz, Government By Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REV.
440 (1953).
0 See KUHN, Op. cit. supra note 7; SLICHTER, op. cit. supra note 7; Cox,
Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MT. L.
REV. 247 (1958) ; Hofstadter and Richter, Aspects of Arbitration Under
Collective Bargaining Agreements in New York Courts, 144 N.Y.L.J. Nos.
57-58, p. 4, col. 1 (Sept 21-22, 1960) ; Shulman, supra note 3; Summers,
supra note 3.
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employment, that are determined in the continuing dialogue
between the power-bearing organs. 10
In the main, procurement of the economic interests of
individual workers is committed to the union that has been
selected to represent them. The principal reason, in fact,
for the existence of unions "is to speak for workers in
negotiating terms of employment, to exercise the collective
strength of workers in obtaining concessions, and to bind
the workers by making collective contracts."'" But trade
unions are no more monolithic than are other complex
social groupings. Within a union the interests of individuals
or subgroups will often be pitted against one another and
institutional needs of the general organization will some-
times clash with the interests of an individual or subgroup.
Normally the union's resolution of such internal conflicts
must prevail, but a corrupt or capricious resolution should
never be considered normal, and, furthermore, normality,
here as always, is not a general but a contextual condition.
When internal union conflict spills over into the variable
arena of collective bargaining, some of the most engaging
and perplexing problems encountered in studying labor
relations result. But, as previously noted, more than any-
thing else the problem here is definitional - What is or
should be the place of the individual worker in what stages
of collective bargaining?
10 As Professor Summers has stated it:
"Collective bargaining as conceived by the statute (NLRA) vests in
the union collective power to enable it to bargain effectively with the
employer, but the purpose of giving the union that power is to benefit
the employees. The function of the collective agreement is not only to
stabilize the relationship of the collective parties, but also to establish
terms and conditions of employment for the employees. Nor are the
interests of the employees conceived in narrow economic terms, for one
of the dominant purposes of collective bargaining is to protect em-
ployees from arbitrary or unequal treatment - to bring a sense of
justice to the workplace. The role of the collective agreement is to
substitute general rules for unchanneled discretion; wages are not to
be based on whimsy but on established rates, layoffs are not governed
by favoritism but by seniority provisions, discharges are not based upon
vindictive bias but upon just cause after objective inquiry."
Summers, supra note 7, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. at 389. See Cox, supra note 3;
Silver, Rights of Individual Employees in the Arbitral Process, 12 N.Y.U.
Ann. Conf. Lab. 53, 56-57 (1959) ; Report of the Committee on Improvement
of Administration of Union-Management Agreements, ABA Section of
Labor Relations Law 33, 46-47 (1954), reprinted in 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143,
158-59 (1955) [henceforth referred to as Report and cited Nw. U.L. REV.].
11 Summers, supra note 8, at 806; See TANNENBAUM & KAHN, PAxTCIPA-
TIon IN UNION LocALs 4-5 (1958) ; Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving
Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 609-10 (1959) ; Note, 35 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 85, 95 (1960) ; see § 1 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U.S.C. § 151(1958) ; cf. Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance - Whose Griev-
ance Is It?, 11 U. Prrn. L. REv. 35, 36 (1949) ; Report, supra note 10, at 143.
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THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS - THE QUEST FOR A
LEGAL THEORY - ROUND PEGS IN SQUARE HOLES?
Judges and lawyers in general are likely to predicate
consideration of labor relations problems with a charac-
terization of the collective bargaining agreement as little
more than an ordinary contract. 2 Both procedural and
substantive rights to be enjoyed under the agreement by
individual workers are then determined in the context of
traditional legal concepts that are found within or closely
adjunct to the law of contracts.13 In this spirit, several
different common law theories have been advanced to de-
scribe the status of the individual under the "labor con-
tract". Employees have been described as third party bene-
ficiaries under the union-employer contract. 4 It has been
held that employees' contracts of hire "incorporate" terms
negotiated by the union with the employer." The em-
ployees have been said to be principals and the union their
agent who negotiates the collective agreement on their
behalf. 6 And employees have been held to be the cestui
que trust, owed a fiduciary duty of fair representation by
the union, considered to be the trustee of the trust.7 None
12 An especially explicit statement to this effect is found in Palsetti v.
Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 167, 161 A. 2d 882, 893 (1960), where the
court said: "A collective bargaining agreement, it is important to note, is
simply a contract, and any rights and remedies the appellant possesses
must be derived solely from the Agreement itself." See Silver, supra note10, at 56; of. Jaeger, Collective Labor Agreements and the Third Party
Beneficiary, 1 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 125 (1960). But see, United Steel
Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Thompson v.Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F. 2d 191, 201 (4th Cir. 1063).
"3 See, e.g., Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 8 LAB. L.J. 850, 852-54 (1957); Note, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 153, 158
n. 25 (1959) ; authorities cited note 12 supra.
1 See J. I. Case Oo. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944); Springer v.
Powder Power Tool Corp., 220 Ore. 102, 108-09, 348 P. 2d 1112, 1115 (1960) ;Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A. 26 882 (1960) ; Howlett,
Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Employer, 8
LAB. L.J. 316, 319 n. 16 (1957) ; Jaeger, supra note 12.
15 See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F. 2d 623, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955) ;
Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934) (and
cases discussed therein) ; Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495,
499, 82 N.W. 2d 172, 174 (1957).
16 See Mueller v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N.W. 798 (1935);
Howlett, supra note 14, at 320 n. 16 (and materials cited therein);
Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agree-
ment - A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421,
431 (1963).
17 See Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Oar Porters, 316 F. 26 191(4th Cir. 1963) ; Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D.Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F. 2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960) ;Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A. 2d 882 (1960) ; Clark v.
Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied,8 Wis. 2d 277, 100 N.W. 2d 317 (1960), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960) ;
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of these theories has in fact provided very extensive protec-
tion for individuals.'" And one consequence of the applica-
tion of such theories, constructed upon the premise that the
collective agreement is an ordinary contract, is that in-
dividuals have usually been deprived of any direct, inde-
pendent access to the procedures that are established in
the agreement to provide for its interpretation and for the
determination of substantive rights. The rationale for ex-
clusion is in the form of a rather pat logical construct,
usually unstated but obviously implied. The collective bar-
gaining agreement is a contract 9 that is negotiated exclu-
sively by union and management. 20 Individual workers
not being direct parties are thus, according to contract doc-
trine, neither promisors nor primary promisees. Therefore,
individual workers have no rights of direct access to the
administrative procedures established in the contract un-
less they are specifically given such rights by the contract
or by separate agreement of the collective parties.2'
On the face of it, both the major and the minor premises
seem sound. But such legalistic logic alone cannot solve
the difficult problem of determining the individual's place
in the collective enterprise. Furthermore, the first premise
of the argument is subject to rather drastic qualification.
That is, analysis of the realities of collective bargaining
demonstrates that the process cannot be handily catalogued
according to traditional common law concepts, for collec-
tive bargaining cannot be equated successfully with other
contract situations and collective agreements are not like
usual contracts.22
Cox, 8upra note 8, at 638-39; Gregory, Fiduciary Standards and the Bar-
gaining and Grievance Process, 8 LAB. L.J. 843 (1957); Hanslowe, Indi-
vidual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 44 (1959);
Isaacson, Labor Arbitration in State Courts, 12 ARB. J. 189-90 (1957)
Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration, ABA Section of Labor
Relations Law 55, 75-76 (1957).
11 See Gray, The Individual Worker and the Right to Arbitrate, 12 LAB.
L.J. 816, 820-21 (1961); Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration,
ABA Section of Labor Relations Law 55, 72-74 (1957); Report, supra
note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 156-61 (1955).
19 See materials cited and quoted note 12 supra.
20 See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
21 See, e.g., Arsenault v. General Electric Co., 142 Conn. 130, 157 A. 2d
918, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960) ; Bailer v. Local 470, Teamsters, 400
Pa. 188, 161 A. 2d 343 (1960); Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y. 24 156, 156 N.E. 2d
297, 182 N.Y.S. 2d 577 (1959); In re Soto, 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 165 N.E. 2d 855,
198 N.Y.S. 24 282 (1960); Curet v. Landriscina, 26 LAB. ARB. 582 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1956); Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
313 F. 2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Domke, Arbitration, 35 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 600, 601 (1960); Note, 58 MicH. L. REv. 796 (1960). Contra, e.g.,
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A. 2d 825 (1963).
22 See, e.g., Chamberlain, supra note 7; CoX, supra note 9, at 262-63;
Kotin, Labor Agreements in Collective Bargaining, 6 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF.
LAB. 1 (1953) ; Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the
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In the first place, the context in which collective bar-
gaining takes place differs markedly from more usual con-
tract contexts. The collective bargaining agreement is the
focal point of especially complex social-economic relation-
ships that vary considerably from shop to shop and indus-
try to industry.23 While other types of contracts may also
be negotiated for complex and variable conditions,24 an
especially distinguishing attribute of the collective bargain-
ing agreement is that it does not create the relationship it
governs, rather it is super-imposed upon an existing rela-
tionship.23 In addition, the agreement is premised not only
on expected continuation of the employer's framework of
industrial organization and the prior-existing practices and
procedures that have been left untouched by the agree-
ment,26 but also upon expected continuation of the relation-
ship itself.2 7 But, unlike the traditional contract situation,
there is little danger that the relationship will not con-
tinue for it is, in every real sense, compulsory. Even if the
interested parties - management, union and workers -
were not compelled by law to deal with one another,23 the
continuation of their relationship would be required by
economic circumstances for the parties are truly wed to
one another in the business enterprise.29 With all this, the
purpose of the collective agreement, likely subject to in-
definite renewals, is to govern, within the industrial com-
plex, the broadest imaginable spectrum of the future be-
havior of not only the collective parties but also of the
individual employees.30
American Legal System, 39 MICi. L. REv. 1109 (1941); Summers, supra
note 3, at 14-16; Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 603, 607-08 (1959).
23 See Cox, supra note 8, at 604; Fuller, supra note 7, at 11; Summers,
supra note 3, at 14-15; Wellington, supra note 5, at 1358; Warns, The
Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 235, 250
(1949).
24 See Fuller, supra note 7, at 17-18.
25 See Lenhoff, supra note 22, at 1109; Summers, supra note 3, at 14;
Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 603, 607 (1959) (citing Summers, supra).
20 See Cox, supra note 9, at 262-63; Summers, supra note 3, at 14; Com-
ment, supra note 25, at 608 (1959) ; of. Dunau, supra note 3, at 739.
27 See Kotin, supra note 22, at 5; Oomment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 603, 608,640 (1959).
21 See, e.g., §§ 8(a) (5), 8(b) (3), 8(d), 61 Stat. 141, 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.§§ 158(a) (5), 158(b) (3), 158(d) (1958). See also Duvin, The Duty to
Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. Rv. 248 (1964) ; Fleming,
The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (1961);
Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, 14 LAE. L.J. 1016 (1963), 112 U. PA. L. REv. 467 (1964).
29 See Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886, 909 (4th Cir.) (quoting Professor
John T. Dunlop), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963) ; Chamberlain, supra
note 7, at 835-39; Kotin, supra note 22, at 5-6; Summers, supra note 3,
at 14-15.10 See Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 603, 607 (1959).
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The unique type of context, in which and for which col-
lective agreements are negotiated, determines their signifi-
cant characteristics as written documents. Unlike what one
expects in a contract, the most striking characteristic of a
collective bargaining agreement is that it does not present
"a detailed statement of responsibilities, duties [and] obli-
gations which the parties have voluntarily assumed in
return for specific considerations and which lends itself to
specific performance." 31 This attribute results from the fact
that the complexity of the continuing relationship which it
governs necessitates that, by comparison, the agreement
itself be uncomplicated and deal explicitly with only the
most significant and difficult problems.2 It is not possible
to resolve all the issues that might arise between the
parties; the situation is far too mercurial and the issues are
too complicated. It can only be expected that procedures to
govern the continuing relations will be established and the
basic outlines of a substantive agreement will be blocked
out. Thus, although the agreement does contain some pro-
visions containing explicit rules to govern some aspects of
the continuing tripartite relationship, in large measure the
agreement is composed of broad standards that must under-
go future interpretation. In this respect the collective
agreement, unlike usual contracts, is indeed like an organic
law or an industrial constitution that does not presume to
terminate bargaining. The agreement in reality anticipates
the continuation of bargaining, but within the procedures
and processes that are provided,3 3 for the parties will most
"I Kotin, supra note 22, at 3. Of course, the implication is not now in-
tended that the courts do not compel specific performance of contract
provisions. Much to the contrary, under § 301(a) of the LMRA, 61 Stat.
156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958) they do just that, but endeavor to
avoid directly compelling specific performance of substantive provisions by
elevating and compelling performance of arbitration clauses. See United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nayi. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). And see the discussion of
arbitration and judicial review infra, at length.
82 See Cox, supra note 9, at 262-63; Goldberg, Labor Arbitration - A
Symposium - Introduction, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 359, 360 (1962) ; Shulman,
supra note 3, at 1004; Summers, supra note 3, at 14-15; Note, 13 STAN. L.
REv. 161, 166 (1960) ; Comment, supra note 30, at 608 (1959).
83 As to legislative, administrative dichotomy, see supra notes 2-5 with
text. A particularly apt summation of the essential attributes of collective
agreements was made by the late Dean Shulman:
"It is not the 'typical' offer and acceptance which normally is the
basis for classroom or text discussions of contract law. It is not an
undertaking to produce a specific result; indeed, it rarely speaks of
the ultimate product. It is not made by parties who seek each other
out to make a bargain from scratch and then go his own way.
"The parties to a collective agreement start in a going enterprise
with a store of amorphous methods, attitudes, fears and problems.
240
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likely have relinquished resort to economic contest, e.g.,
strikes and lockouts, during its term . 4 And to these admin-
istrative processes, all the parties - union, management
and workers - must generally look for vindication of their
interests and claims under the agreement.
THE UNION - EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING
REPRFSENTATIVE
For a union to be able to fulfill its major legitimate
function, the pursuit of maximum prerogatives for all the
workers it represents, it is imperative that only the union
be involved in the negotiation of the formal collective
agreement. In recognition of this, Congress has adopted as
a corner stone of national labor relations policy the prin-
ciple that the union, duly selected under the statutory
scheme by election of a majority of the workers in a bar-
gaining unit, is the exclusive bargaining representative of
all the workers in that unit.3 5 The wisdom of thus exclud-
ing individuals from participation in the negotiation of the
written agreement is unimpeachable. In negotiating the
agreement, union and management are concerned with
formulating the broad outlines of the system of industrial
self-government. During these negotiations, more acutely
Though cast in adversary position, both [union and management] are
dependent upon their common enterprise....
"They meet in their contract negotiations to fix the terms and con-
ditions of their collaboration in the future. But the resulting collective
agreement covers only a small part of their joint concern. It is based
on a mass of unstated assumptions and practices as to which the under-
standing of the parties may actually differ, and which it is wholly
impractical to list in the agreement. It is similarly impractical, if not
impossible, to anticipate and guard against all possible future con-
tingencies .... 
Shulman, The Role of Arbitration in the Collective Bargaining Process(unpublished paper used in the Harvard Business School), as quoted in
Cox, supra note 9, at 262. See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nay. Co., supra note 31, at 578-582; Goldberg, supra note 32, at 360.
"Arbitration, to be considered at length later in the'article, is widely
recognized as a voluntary substitute for economic contest and litigation.
As to arbitration as a substitute for litigation, see United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Gray, supra note 18, at 820;
Note, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 324, 330 (1960).
As to arbitration as a substitute for economic warfare, see Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour 0o., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ; Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) ("Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance
disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.") ; KUHN, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 1; Shulman, supra note 3, at 1007; Summers, supra
note 3, at 17; Freidin, Legal Status o! Labor Arbitration, 1 N.Y.U. ANN.
CONF. LAB. 233, 234 (1948).
"See NLRA § 9, as amended, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1958) ; quoted infra, note 92; J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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than at other times, the union must balance the demands
and interests of worker against worker, class of workers
against class of workers and must generally engage in the
practice of politics as the art of the practical or the attain-
able.3 6 In order to assure maximum gain to the entire
group represented, the union must be able to bargain from
a position of absolute strength, unattended at the bargain-
ing table itself by dissent from those whom it represents.3 7
Certain matters of immediate individual concern, how-
ever, are determined at these conference tables. During
the negotiation of the basic agreement, at least a portion of
the union's energies must be directed toward the immedi-
ate establishment of individual employment rights. 38 All
such rights cannot remain contingent upon the continua-
tion of the institutional dialogue that occurs after a con-
tract has been accepted and during which time the union
will probably have found it auspicious to have sacrificed its
most powerful economic weapon - the strike. In addition,
the individual workers do have some interest in the char-
acter of the institutional (i.e., grievance and arbitration)
procedures that are to be established to interpret the writ-
ten agreement and to adjudicate their claims under it. But,
participation by individual workers in the negotiation of
the collective agreement would be at least as detrimental
to their own and the collective interests as would the par-
ticipation of stockholders in the negotiation of commercial
contracts be to the interests of the stockholders and the
publicly held corporation. Historically, a central concern
of the American Labor Movement was to secure the right
of individual workers to act effectively in concert, i.e., to
bargain collectively with employers. A major consequence
of the NLRA was that federal governmental recognition
and protection was afforded this right. 9 It is unnecessary
to review the social evils that were attendant upon the
" See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) ; J. I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, supra note 35; Cox, supra note 8, at 604.
17 Cf. Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. at 150; Sherman, supra note
11, at 35-37.
18 See, e.g., Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F. 2d 138, 140 (5th Cir.
1958) ; Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132 (1959),
rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100 N.W. 2d 317, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962
(1960), criticized on this ground in Note, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 324, 336
(1960); Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 498, 82 N.W. 2d
172, 174 (1957). See also materials cited and quoted, note 10 8upra;
Fuller, supra note 7, at 10; Jaeger, supra note 12, at 133; Shulman, supra
note 3, at 1005; Anno., Right of Individual Employees to Enforce Collec-
tive Labor Agreement Against Employer, 18 A.L.R. 2d 352, 364-70 (1950)
Note, 25 BROOKLYN L. REv. 352, 357 (1959).
11 See NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, § 101, 61 Stat. 136,
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958) ("Findings and Declaration of Policy").
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weakness of individual workers, unable to act in concert,
to recognize the current utility - indeed the necessity -
for exclusive collective representation at this stage.4"
Since the group interest here is of such a magnitude as
to eclipse any policy that might favor individual repre-
sentation or negotiation, it is far better to require the in-
dividual to utilize the internal processes of his union for
the vindication of his interests than to permit the integrity
of collective action to be breached at this juncture. If,
however, a resulting agreement invidiously discriminates
or is perverse in its denial of the interests of individuals
or groups of individuals, resort may then properly be made
to a challenge, external to the self-governmental processes,
in the courts. Such an action would usually be in the form
of a suit, primarily against the union, on the ground that
the union, often in overt or tacit concert with the employer,
had violated its duty of fair representation.4
Admitting the utility of excluding individuals from the
conference tables at which the basic agreement is formu-
lated, it does not necessarily follow that the individual
should invariably be excluded from separate participation
in the private administrative proceedings wherein his
rights under the agreement are adjudicated. It becomes
40 See Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 357 U.S. 14,
209 (1921); NLRA § 1, supra note 39; see also Slichter, Weakness of
Individual Bargaining, in ,BAKKE, et al., UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND THE
PunLic 53-55 (1960) (reprinted from SLicHTER, MODERN ECONOMIo SociEYr
653-57 (1931)) ; Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 150.
41 The Supreme Court formulated the so-called statutory duty of fair
representation in a case, involving racial discrimination in the negotiation
of a collective agreement, that arose under the Railroad Labor Act. Steele
v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). A like duty exists under the
NLRA. See Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) ; Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The duty has been extended
to protect workers in crafts or bargaining units not represented by a dis-
criminating union, from having their job rights invaded. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952). The doctrine, moreover,
has been held to extend beyond the negotiation of the formal collective
agreement to compel fair representation in administraition of the agree-
ment through the grievance procedure. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957). It is also clear that all invidious discriminations, not merely those
based upon race, are prohibited. Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters, 316 F. 2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). In
Humphrey, the latest Supreme Court decision involving fair representa-
tion, discussed at length infra, notes 160-92 with text, a duty of fair
representation was implied from the collective bargaining agreement rather
than from the union's statutory status as exclusive bargaining agent of all
the workers in the bargaining unit. As to a possibly parallel fiduciary
duty of union officials under § 501 of the LMRDA, 73 Stat. 535 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 501 (Supp. IV, 1963), see infra notes 206-14 with text. See
also, on fiduciary obligation of labor unions in collective bargaining, the
materials cited note 17 supra.
Of late, the National Labor Relations Board has taken steps, see infra
notes 230-43 with text, to enforce a statutory duty of fair representation.
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necessary to examine the relationship that individual and
group interests in grievance determinations bear to the
maintenance of the integrity of purpose of these pro-
cedures. Consideration, in turn, must be made of the extent
to which grievance proceedings involve continuation of
general collective bargaining as well as adjudication of
individual rights that may be vested under the formal
collective agreement.
THE GRIvANCE PROCEDURE
Since "the function of the collective agreement is not
only to stabilize the relationship of the collective parties,
but also to establish terms and conditions of employment
of the employees," 42 employees attach great importance to
the grievance process.43 This is because it follows from the
definition of a "grievance", which "in the language of labor
relations is an assertion of a claim under the provisions of
a collective bargaining agreement,"44 that the substantive
provisions of the written agreement are implemented
largely pursuant to the grievance procedure.
Although grievance procedures differ in detail and prac-
tice, there is considerable uniformity in broad structural
outline:
"[A] typical agreement . . .provides for successive
steps [culminating in arbitration] through which a
worker and his representative may take a grievance if
they receive no satisfactory answer.
"Most commonly, agreements provide for four steps,
though some may list as many as six....
"The participants at each succeeding step are
higher-ranking officers of management and union. In
early steps the provisions usually require but a single
union representative to meet with a designated line
officer. They meet, discuss, and try to settle problems
as they arise. In the step before arbitration a commit-
tee of union representatives and one or more staff
42 Summers, supra note 7, at 389. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195, 200 (1963); SLICHTE, op. cit. supra note 7; Blumrosen, supra
note 8, at 1475-77.
13 PRcELL, BLUE COLLAR MAN: PATTERNS OF DUAL ALLEGIANCE IN INDUS-
TRY 200-09 (1960) ; see KUHN, OP. Cit. supra note 7, at 22; Shulman, supra
note 3, at 1022.
41 Gray, The Individual Worker and the Right to Arbitrate, 12 LAB. LJ.
816, 817 (1961). For other definitions see .SLICHTE, et al., THE IMPACT
OF COLLEeTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 693-96 (1960) ; Dunau, 8UPra
note 3, at 736; Rose, The Nature of a Grievance in Labor Relations, 3 LAB.
L.J. 599 (1952).
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officers of the industrial relations or personnel depart-
ment meet regularly."4
Regardless of the specific form of the grievance pro-
cedure, it is at this stage of the total collective bargaining
process that the individual has his most tangible interest,
for the determination of a grievance is likely to have a
visibly direct, immediate and personal effect upon him.4"
Depending upon the outcome he may retain or lose his job,
be promoted or passed over, gain or lose money, be dis-
ciplined or exonerated. Furthermore, there are a number
of reasons why a worker might believe that his interest is
not properly served by the union's handling of a grievance.
First, the worker and the union might merely have a bona-
fide disagreement as to the interpretation of a provision of
the collective agreement, 7 or they might otherwise dis-
agree as to the merits of his grievance or claim. Second, the
worker might think he has reason to fear union favoritism. 8
A worker might believe that his interests are either being
opposed or inadequately represented because he belongs to
a disfavored racial," ethnic, sex 50 or age class or that he is
personally obnoxious to the union leaders or membership.
On the level of internal union politics, an individual may
"I KUHN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 6-7; see Gemrich, The Grievance
Procedure in the Administration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, in
SymposiuM ox LABOR RELATIONS LAW 295 (Slovenko ed. 1961).
'Some variations include, prior to (or as a substitute for) arbitration,
proceedings before a high level board composed of equal numbers of union(usually international) officials and officials of various companies in the
employees association that conducts collective bargaining with the inter-
national union. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 338-39 (1964)(grievance procedure outlined infra note 165) ; 'Parks v. IBEW, 314 F. 2d
886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
46 See Cox, supra note 8, at 615; Cox, supra ntote 13, at 854; Rose, supra
note 44; Note, 25 'BRooKLy L. REv. 352, 358 (1959).
7 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration, ABA Section
of Labor Relations Law 55, 73 (1957) ; Isaacson, supra note 17, at 187;
Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 603, 628 (1959).
This is especially common in situations involving seniority provisions.
See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; Clark v. Hein-Werner
Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d
277, 100 N.W. 2d 317, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
11 See KUHN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 126; Cox, supra note 13, at S54;
Cox, supra note 8, at 630; Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and
Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REv. 235, 239 (1961),
also published in the AmITRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEmY OF ARBITRATORS 69(Pollard ed. 1961) [henceforth cited to 13 STAN. L. Rgv. only] ; Sherman,
supra note 11, at 49; Summers, supra note 7, at 393-94; Report, supra note
10, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 143, 146-47, 153-55; Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 603
(1959).
"1 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
10 See, e.g., Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 249 Mich. 108, 84 N.W. 2d' 523(1957); Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y., 1950).
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fear that union power will be abused because he is not a
member5' or because he belongs to the political opposition5 2
or a different union. An individual might also fear that,
to his detriment, he simply does not have as much political
influence within the union as other individuals who are
backing interests in opposition to his. Third, workers might
have reason to fear that bureaucratic inefficiency or preju-
dice will result in "incomplete investigation of the facts,
reliance on untested evidence, or colored evaluation of wit-
nesses [that] may lead the union to reject grievances which
more objective inquiry would prove meritorious. '54 Finally,
there might be reason to believe that over-zealous concern
for institutional interests of the union and the collective
enterprise will induce union officials to trade off unrelated
grievances or make wholesale settlements that relinquish
some meritorious claims55 or even to accept resolutions, that
very much lack in personal justice, of some grievances.5
While the possibility of similar actions, harmful to par-
ticular individuals' interests, may exist when the union
conducts the formal negotiation of the collective agree-
ment, individuals do have more legitimate cause to fear ex-
clusive union control of grievance machinery than they do
to fear exclusive union control over formal contract nego-
tiations. Since the grievance procedure, unlike the formal
negotiation stage, is concerned more with the settlement of
particular claims than with the statement of general rules
and classifications, it "is particularly susceptible to abuse,
for through it individuals or groups may be singled out
[more easily and surreptitiously] for arbitrary treatment."57
51 See, e.g., Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F. 2d
191 (4th Cir. 1963).
52 See, e.g., 'Bailer v. Local 470, Teamsters, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A. 2d 343(1960).
58 See, e.g., In re Soto, 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 165 N.E. 2d 855, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 282
(1960).
54 Summers, supra note 7, at 393.
15 KuHN, op. cit. supra note 7 passim; Summers, supra note 7, at 391,
393; Individual Rights in Grievance Arbitration Procedure: Grievances and
Arbitration, Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration, ABA Section
on Labor Relations Law, 56 L.R.R. 418 (1964).
58 Summers, supra note 7, at 393. Professor Summers commented on
Union News Co. v. Hfldreth, 295 F. 2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961), adhered to after
new trial, 315 F. 2d 548 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1963) :
"The management of a restaurant found that the food costs were
out of line with past experience, a fact indicating wastage, serving too
large portions, or theft. Unable to discover who or what was at fault,
management picked five of the twelve employees at random and
replaced them. When food costs appeared to go down, this was taken
as proof that the culprits had been caught and the five employees were
discharged. The union agreed that 'just cause' had been shown and
refused to process a grievance on behalf of the discharged employees."
57 Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 393 (1962).
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Moreover, when formal negotiations are conducted to
amend a collective agreement or to draft a new one, it is
clear to all that something new or rather different is likely
to result. When, on the other hand, negotiations or adjust-
ments are undertaken through invocation of the grievance
machinery, established for application and interpretation
of the existing agreement, a new result can be more easily
passed off as an extension, not a modification, of the old
agreement. 58
There is, understandably, not only more reason but also
more pressure for either enhancing substantive public or
external, i.e., judicial and/or administrative, review of
grievance and arbitral decisions or promoting participation
by affected individuals in many of the proceedings that
constitute the private administrative processes of collec-
tive bargaining. The intensity and form of the pressure will
depend in part upon the character of the particular griev-
ance or interest.
Obviously, an individual's interest, both substantive and
procedural, will appear most direct if the grievance to be
processed is his own. However, individuals may also have
direct interests in the grievances of other employees. 9 If,
for example, the grievant is not laid off, another individual
may be laid off instead; if the grievant gains seniority, an-
other worker's seniority may suffer."0 Even the determi-
11 Professor Summers has cogently stated the relevant technical distinc-
tions between contract negotiation and administration:
"Although contract making (or amending) and contract administra-
tion are not neatly severable, they are procedurally distinct processes.
Most union constitutions prescribe the method of contract ratification,
and it is distinct from grievance settlement; the power to make and
amend contracts is not placed in the same hands as the power to
adjust grievances. [n. 145; Many union constitutions require that all
collective agreements be approved by the international union, some
create special committees or conferences to negotiate and approve
agreements and a substantial number require ratification by member-
ship votes. National Industrial Conference Bd., Handbook of Union
Government Structure and Procedures 49-54 (1955). In contrast,
grievance settlements, particularly at the lower steps, are commonly
made by the local officers or shop stewards.] Indeed, many union con-
stitutions expressly bar any officer from ratifying any action which
constitutes a breach of any contract."
Summers, supra note 57, at 397; see also Blumrosen, The Worker and Three
Phases of Unionism: Administrative and JudiciaZ Control of the Worker -
Union Relationship, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 1435, 1475-76 (1963).
11 See, e.g., Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132(1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100 N.W. 2d 317 (1960), cert.
denied, 362 US. 962 (1960); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69
HARV. L. REv. 601, 615 (1956) ; Summers, supra note 57, at 363-70, 393-95.
60 See Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., supra note 59; Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair
Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REv. 235, 237 (1961) ; Report,
supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 143, 153-54 (1955) ; Note, 46 VA. L. REv.
802, 806 (1960) ; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 946, 951-52 (1957).
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nation of a wage, vacation or disciplinary dispute may have
an effect on workers other than the named grievants, for
the disposition of the grievance could be used as a quasi-
precedent for the future resolution of similar claims.61
Actually, the extent to which workers will be legiti-
mately interested in grievances not brought by or on behalf
of themselves will depend largely upon the type of griev-
ance that is involved. For the present purposes of analysis,
it will be useful to classify grievances into three categories.
First, there are those grievances, excepting disputes as to
seniority, that concern economic benefits allegedly due
under the contract, e.g., rates of pay, job classification, vaca-
tion, retirement, etc. As to these, there is a substantially
direct secondary group interest because of the possible
precedential value of the resulting dispositions. However,
it can be anticipated that the union will almost universally
support the grievant if he has a colorable claim, for his
victory would generally have a cumulative effect of in-
creasing the benefits enjoyed by other employees. Since
both the grievant and potential intervenors will normally
gain from a victory and the union can be expected consci-
entiously to pursue the claim and these claims do not
usually involve "critical job interests", there will compara-
tively rarely be pressure by individuals or groups for sepa-
rate participation in this type of grievance determination.62
The second broad classification consists of disciplinary
grievances. The most extreme sub-type in this category is
comprised of grievances involving disciplinary discharge -
the so-called economic capital punishment or death penalty.
Because of the importance of the particular facts involved,
the determinations of these grievances carry very little
precedential value; consequently there usually is no signifi-
cant legitimate pressure on the part of secondary groups to
81 See ELoNoXi & ELKOrRi, How ARnrrRATON Woans 114-116 (1960);
Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 155 (1955) ; cf. Jones, Labor
Arbitration and Stare Decisis: Some Introductory Remarks, 4 U.C.L.A.L.
REy. 657 (1957) ; Roberts, Precedent and Procedure in Arbitration Oases,
6 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. LAB. 149, 159-60 (1953) ; Shulman, Reason, Contract
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HsAv. L. REv. 999, 1020 (1955) ; Note, 35
ST. JOHN'S L. RaV. 85, 95 (1960); Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 603, 635,
637 (1959).
62 Professor Summers reports that "more than three-fourths of the cases
coming to the courts involve seniority rights or disciplinary discharges.
The individual's very livelihood is at stake [in these]. In personal terms,
loss of seniority undermines his sense of security, and discharge darkens
his good name." Summers, supra note 57, at 392; see Blumrosen, Legal
Protection For Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus
Employee Autonomy, 13 RuTGEos L. REv. 631 (1959) ; Report, supra note 10,
50 Nw. U.L. REv. at 146 (1955).
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participate." But, since the impact on the individual,
especially of a discharge, can be quite substantial and since
there may be circumstances in which he has reason to fear
that although the union goes through the motions of repre-
senting him it actually favors the invocation of the dis-
cipline, there is likely to be pressure on the part of the
grievant to participate.6 4
Grievances in the third classification involve seniority
determinations. As to such grievances, more employees
than just the named grievants will invariably have direct
and significant interests in the outcome, for seniority
grievances are, in a real sense, primarily disputes between
subgroups of employees that concern particularly import-
ant job interests.6 5 In proceedings to determine seniority,
in fact, a common cause for complaint, either by the origi-
nal grievants or by possible intervenors, is that if a par-
ticular employee or group gains seniority, the complainants
will be disadvantaged.6 Naturally, the affected employees
who are supported by neither the union nor the employer
will most desire to participate personally in the grievance
determination,67 but it is likely that these employees, who
are opposed by the union, will desire to participate even if
the employer ostensibly supports their position.68
"But cf. Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. at 146 (1955). ("Even
in discharge cases, the other employees may object to working with the
complainant because he is not a suitable fellow employee." In footnote 6
to the Report, supra, such an incident is discussed).
14 See, e.g., In re Soto, 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 165 N.E. 2d 855, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 282
(1960) ; Bailor v. Local 470, Teamsters, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A. 2d 343 (1960).
"5 See Wirtz, Due Process in Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR AND THE
PARTIES, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbi-
trators 1, 23-24 (McKelvey ed. 1958) ; Stockman, Discussion of Due Process
in Arbitration, in id. at 37, 43 (1958); Fleming, supra note 60, at 237.
The importance of seniority cannot be overly stressed for "[S]eniority,
defined and assured by agreements, is vital in industrial government; it
controls layoffs, recall rights, promotion, transfer, demotion, eligibility for
vacation and welfare plans, distribution of overtime, and shift preference."
United States Commission on Civil Rights Report: Employment 134 (1961).
66 See, e.g., Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Oar Porters, 316 F. 2d
191 (4th Cir. 1963). Not only in seniority cases, but also in "promotion,
and transfer cases the protest is against another employee receiving benefits
the complainant feels he should receive." Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw.
U.L. REV. at 146 (1955).
11 In some such circumstances only two groups of employees are con-
cerned. The employer remains neutral and the union backs one group.
See Humphrey v. Mbore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). In other circumstances, more
than two groups of employees will be involved-. The union backs group one,
the employer 'backs group two and group three is out in the cold. See
Matter of Arbitration between Iroquois Beverage Corp. and International
Brewery Workers, 14 Misc. 2d 290, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955), nbted,
66 YALE L.J. 946 (1957).
68 See Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132 (1959),
rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100 N.W. 2d 317 (1960), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 962 (1960).
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Since conflicting interests of different employees may be
involved in a given grievance, it is evident that in the course
of using the grievance machinery the union must balance
interests within the grievance just as it must balance in-
terests when it decides what issues to press in negotiating
the formal agreement. Moreover, the union may have occa-
sion not only to balance conflicting interests within a par-
ticular grievance, but it might find it appropriate as well to
balance unrelated grievances against one another, relin-
quishing some claims in order to gain favorable settlement
of others.69 But the balancing exercises undertaken here,
both within a given grievance or between unrelated griev-
ances, will rarely be of the same order as those which must
be involved in the initial drafting of the collective bargain-
ing agreement - primarily because of the very existence of
the written agreement."
The grievance procedure really has a dualistic character
that results from the characteristic of the collective agree-
ment as a document containing some broad or ambiguous
and some particular and relatively settled provisions and
which generally embodies the twin crucial decisions to
foreswear economic warfare and to resolve future conflict
during the term of the agreement within grievance and
arbitral machinery. On the one hand, individuals do, or
should come to, enjoy specific rights that are created or
vested by the agreement and these rights are, or should be,
cognizable in grievance proceedings.71 On the other hand,
many provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are
sufficiently ambiguous as to place in doubt the exact char-
acter of the rights to which the individual may, in any con-
crete controversy, be entitled.72 Furthermore, problems
raised in grievances may not really have been anticipated
in the substantive provisions of the written agreement or,
even as to comparatively explicit provisions, conditions
may so drastically change as to require an adjustment that
differs from the one originally contemplated in the written
agreement.8 The grievance procedure is, therefore, not
merely used for relatively mechanical administration and
application of explicit and clear provisions of an existing
formal agreement; it is also concerned with the continua-
tion of negotiations between union and management which
69 See note 55 supra.
70 See notes 22-34 supra with accompanying text.
71 See notes 10 and 38 supra.
72 See notes 31-33 supra with accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 32, at 360; Shulman, quoted supra at
note 33; Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37
N.Y.U.L. RE V. 471, 474-75 (1962).
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makes it a part of the continuous collective bargaining
process. But, even though the provisions of the agreement
may be ambiguous or incomplete and therefore subject to
continued negotiation, the agreement does provide "a stand-
ard which both sides have agreed is the norm in relation to
which a dispute is to be settled. ' 4 The Supreme Court
appears recently to have held that these standards are
suitable for substantive judicial scrutiny.7 5
It is now likely established that, because the existing
agreement does provide such standards, broader substan-
tive judicial review of union-employer bargaining decisions
made during the administration of the agreement is avail-
able than is available over similar collective decisions that
are made when the basic agreement is formally negotiated
or amended. If this is true, it would still remain to be ascer-
tained how the willingness of the courts to engage in this
comparatively expansive substantive judicial review of ad-
ministrative determinations by the collective parties re-
lates to proposals to enhance workers' procedural rights in
the administrative proceedings of collective bargaining -
particularly in arbitration. So far as the individual is gen-
erally concerned, the alternatives - substantive external
supervision of collective action versus individual participa-
tion - may turn out to be fungible for, as analysis of the
cases will indicate, "all the individual seeks is access to
some neutral tribunal where, along with union and man-
agement, he shall have an opportunity to be heard. 7 6 On
the other hand, so far as the most appropriate institutional
structuring of collective bargaining is concerned, one of
the approaches might turn out to be preferable. A pre-
liminary step in determining how the law should best re-
spond to these matters involves consideration of what law
is relevant.
WHAT LAW, FEDERAL OR STATE, GOVERNS THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
The question of what law, federal or state, governs the
collective bargaining agreement and the relationships func-
tioning thereunder is related primarily to judicial interpre-
tation of section 301 (a) of the LMRA which provides that:
7'Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective
Bargaining, 50 CoLU . L. REV. 731, 733 (1950); see Summers, Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BUFFALO L. REv.
239, 245 (1960).
75 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), to be discussed at great length
later in this regard.
76 Summers, 8upra note 57, at 370.
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"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act...
may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.""
The issue has now been clearly settled in favor of federal
law, but it has not always been entirely so.
Until recently both federal and state courts generally
ignored the full implication of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in the celebrated Lincoln Mills7 8 case that section 301
embodies a congressional mandate for the federal courts to
entertain suits based upon collective bargaining agree-
ments and thereby to create a substantive federal common
law of labor relations. Relying on the earlier case of Asso-
ciation of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp.,79 in which it was held that suits to secure
"uniquely personal" rights were not cognizable under sec-
tion 301 (a), courts either refused to entertain or to decide
under federal law suits brought by or directly on behalf of
individual employees."0 An anomalous situation was there-
by created in which a single collective agreement was
likely to be subjected to judicial interpretations within
differing and possibly conflicting bodies of substantive
law.81 More specifically, as the Supreme Court was later
to declare:
"The rights of individual employees concerning
rates of pay and conditions of employment are a major
focus of the negotiation and administration of collec-
tive bargaining contracts. Individual claims lie at the
heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, are
to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union
7761 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
78 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
79 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
so See, e.g., Item Co. v. New Orleans Newspaper Guild, 256 F. 2d 855
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867 (1958); United Steelworkers v.
Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 241 F. 2d 547 (3rd Cir. 1957) ; Copra v.
Suro, 236 F. 2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Prin v. DeLuca, 194 F. Supp. 852
(E.D. N.Y. 1961); Dimeco v. Fisher, 185 F. Supp. 213 (D. N.J. 1960);
Communications Workers v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 160 F. Supp. 822 (N.D.
Ohio 1958), aff'd, 265 F. 2d 221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959) ;
Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y. 2d 156, 156 N.E. 2d 297, 182 N.Y.S. 2d 577 (1959).
'l More elaborate discussions of the anomaly and other reasons why the
Westinghou8e doctrine was inappropriate are to be found in: Ostrofsky v.
United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782, 789-90 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.
2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960) ; Summers, supra note
74, at 241 n. 12; Summers, supra note 57, at 370-75; Note, 71 HARV. L. REv.
1169 (1958).
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interests and many times precipitate grave questions
concerning the interpretation and enforceability of the
collective bargaining contract on which they are based.
To exclude these claims from the ambit of section 301
would stultify the congressional policy of having the
administration of collective bargaining contracts ac-
complished under a uniform body of federal substan-
tive law. '8 2
Nevertheless, for almost eight years after the Lincoln Mills
decision, claims of the collective parties were adjudicated
according to federal law, but, since individual claims were
not considered to be within the scope of section 301, they
were adjudicated with reference to state substantive law.
Beginning with Lincoln Mills, however, the Supreme
Court, accompanied by some of the more daring state and
lower federal courts, 83 eroded the Westinghouse doctrine
until the Court was finally able to declare, in Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, that "subsequent decisions here have
removed the underpinnings of Westinghouse and its holding
is no longer authoritative as a precedent. '' s4 It now appears
that collective agreements within the sweep of the Com-
merce power of the United States are subject only to
federal substantive law and further that not only suits by
unions and by individuals supported by their unions,85 but
also suits by individuals unsupported or even opposed by
their unions,8" to enforce even "uniquely personal" em-
ployee rights, under such collective agreements, are justici-
able under section 301. These actions, moreover, are not
subject to pre-emptive jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board even when they involve matters that
admittedly fall within the ambit of sections 7 or 8 of the
NLRA.87 Finally, cases under section 301 may be entertained
s2 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
Is See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) ; Ostrofsky
v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782, 789-90 (by implication) (D. Md.
1959), aff'd, 273 F. 2d 614 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1900);
Karcz v. Luther Mfg. 00., 338 Mass. 313, 317, 155 N.E. 2d 441, 444 (1959);
Springer v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 220 Ore. 102, 106-07, 348 P. 2d 1112,
1114 (1960).
s' 371 U.S. 195, 199 (1962).
65See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); General
Drivers, Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963).
81 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). But see Joint Board v.
Rogers Peet Co., 56 L.R.R.M. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), and Steiner v.
Cornell Utilities, 56 L.R.R.M. 2880 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (cases decided
under state law with no discussion of the Supreme Court decisions).
87 See Humphrey v. Moore. 375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). The Court has also recently held that National
Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction over § 9 representation issues does not
prevent grievance arbitration of work assignment or inter-union representa-
tion disputes. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). See
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in either federal or state courts,88 but state as well as
federal judges must of course apply federal substantive
law to be formulated in accordance with "the policy of our
national labor laws."8 9
As to the sources of such federal law, the Court has
held that:
"The Labor Management Relations Act expressly fur-
nishes some substantive law. It points out what the
parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other
problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory
mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction
but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legis-
lation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate
that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will
be determined by the nature of the problem."90
Professor Summers has recently and very expertly ex-
amined two of the major federal law sources that might
appropriately be drawn upon to describe and institution-
alize a quasi-independent place for the individual employee
in the grievance and arbitral processes.9 Rather than
recanvass in detail the ground that already has been so
well explored, for present purposes it will suffice to indi-
cate the two main federal source areas and to refer the
reader to Professor Summers' analysis.
The first significant source of employable federal law
is section 9(a) of the NLRA 2 This provision designates
majority unions as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tives of all the workers in appropriate bargaining units.
Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilemma: The Carey Decision and
Trilateral Arbitration of Jurisdictional Disputes, 11 U.C.L.A.L. RV. 327
(19G4).
11 See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; Charles Dhwd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra
note 87.
"'Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957): See
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-05 (1962).
90 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 89, at 457.
91 Summers, supra note 57, at 376-88.
1261 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958):
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment; Provided, That any individual employee or a group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances
to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the
bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at
such adjustment."
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The statutory designation is followed by the proviso that
individual employees are to have the right, in the presence
of the union if it chooses to be present, to settle their own
grievances with the employer. Such settlements, however,
may not contravene the collective bargaining agreement
then in effect. Although there is evidence to the contrary,93
Professor Summers demonstrates that it is possible to read
section 9(a) as a congressional mandate directing the
recognition of non-defeasible procedural rights for indi-
vidual employees in all aspects of grievance determina-
tions.9 4 Until now, however, in the decided cases touching
upon the rights to be enjoyed by individuals in the griev-
ance process, the courts, have "generally ignored the policy
thrust of the words and the history of the proviso. Instead
they have seemingly felt imprisoned by their own self-
constructed theories, or have reasoned from policies de-
clared without reference to the provisions of the federal
statute."9 5 Recently, for example, the Second Circuit "con-
cluded that rather than vesting an 'indefeasible right' in
the individual employee, section 9(a) 'merely set up a
buffer between the employee and his union', permitting
him the 'privilege' of presenting personal grievances to his
employer while protecting the latter from charges of unfair
labor practices by 'authorizing' him to adjust such griev-
98 McRee, The Adversely Affected Employee and the Grievance and Arbi-
tration Process, in SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 431, 434-35
(Slovenko ed. 1961) ; Williams, Intervention: Rights and Policies, in LABOR
ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE, Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 266, 270-75 (Kahn ed. 1963);
Cox, supra note 59, at 621-24; Dunau, Employee Participation in the
Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 746-51
(1950); Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 25, 36-37 (1959) ; Kleeb, Recent Problems in the Creation of
Federal Law Under Section 301, 52 GEo. L.J. 296, 305-09 (1964) ; Ratner,
Some Contemporary Observations on Section 301, 52 GEo. L.J. 260, 272-76
(1964) ; Smythe, Individual and Group Interests in Collective Labor Rela-
tions, 13 LAB. L.J. 439, 443-44 (1962).
1' Summers, supra note 57, at 376-85 (Interpreting the language of
§ 9(a) and other provisions of the NLRA in the light of the legislative
history of the 1947 amendment of § 9(a) as affected by two prior decisions:
Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), enforced as modified, 147 F. 2d 69
(5th Cir. 1945) ; Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945),
aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).)
See also, Gray, The Individual Worker and the Right to Arbitrate, 12
LAB. L.J. 816 (1961) ; Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee
as Against the Employer, 8 LAB. L.J. 316, 317-19 (1957); Lenhoff, The
Effects of Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual, 9 ARB. J. 3,
14-16 (1954); Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance - Whose
Grievance Is It?, 11 U. PiTT. L. REv. 35 (1949) ; Report, supra note 10, 50
Nw. U.L. REv. at 169-79 (1955).
See generally as to the legislative history, Shugerman, Individual
Employee Grievances Under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, 1949 WIs.
L. REv. 154.
11 Summers, supra note 74, at 241.
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ances without union interference." 98  The New Jersey
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has accepted Professor
Summers' position and adopted an opposing construction
of section 9(a) .9 Since the Supreme Court has not yet
96Note, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1513, 1516 (1963) commenting on Black-
Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F. 2d 179 (2d
Cir. 1962).
The case involved a declaratory judgment proceeding brought by a com-
pany against a union and an employee represented by the union. The
employee had been discharged for failure to return to work after a pro-
tracted illness. Purporting to have complied with the preliminary steps
of the existing grievance procedure, the employee demanded that the em-
ployer submit to arbitration of his grievance. In a suit to avoid arbitration,
the employer argued that the employee had no right under contract or law
to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals agreed with both propositions.
The following cases have considered and approved or followed Black-
Clawson: Local 12405, Dist. 50, UMW v. Martin Marietta Corp., 328 F. 2d
945 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Carey v. General Electric Co., 315 F. 2d 499 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 12 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1964) ; Proctor & Gamble Independent
Union of Port Ivory v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F. 2d 181, 184-85
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963) ; Brandt v. United States
Lines, Inc., 55 L.R.R.M. 2665 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
11 Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A. 2d 825 (1963).
Plaintiff, an employee of the company, was discharged, allegedly for in-
efficiency. He asked his union representative to investigate the case and it
did so but declined to take the grievance further, informing the plaintiff
that he had no case. In an action, against the union and the company,
that went to the New Jersey Supreme Court, plaintiff alleged that the
collective agreement had been breached in that his discharge violated the
terms of the agreement and was further breached by the failure of the
collective parties to process his claim in accordance with the grievance
procedure established in the agreement.
The court held that the suit arose under § 301 of the LMRA and was
therefore subject to federal substantive law. Interpreting § 9(a) in the
light of its history and the court's view of sound labor relations policy, the
court stated that:
"It is true the employee is not a nominal or formal party to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. But the rights, duties and benefits of his
employment are so created and controlled by the agreement made in his
behalf by his statutory representative, the union, that foi some pur-
poses, at least, he ought to be regarded as a third-party beneficiary
in substance as well as in spirit, or as possessing independent rights
under section 9(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 8upra,
which ought to be considered as part of every such contract by opera-
tion of law." 40 N.J. at 81-82, 190 A. 2d at 836.
The court held that upon the refusal of the union to do so, a grievant
had an unlimited right of his own to process and adjust his grievance
relating to personal rights. In fact, it was held that before a suit at law
for breach by the union of its duty of fair representation would be enter-
tained the grievant was required to exhaust all avenues of private relief.
The court further concluded' that the Congressional purpose of § 9(a) and
the policy under § 301 favoring arbitration and uniformity and consistency
of results in grievance determinations would all be served by requiring
individual grievances to be handled through the contractual system of
arbitration. Upon the union's refusal to compel arbitration, the court held
that plaintiff should have requested it. In arbitration invoked by an in-
dividual 'the union could participate to argue its view of the contract pro-
visions, but the employee is to be "in control of the procedural steps
wherever necessary to achieve a just determination." 40 N.J. at 92, 190
A. 2d at 841. However, if the arbitrator were to find' that the individual's
claim was colorable and of a substantial nature the union would share the
costs with the company, if the arbitrator failed to so find the court provided
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considered the scope of the section as it bears upon the
rights of individuals, it is by no means clear that the gloss
applied by the Second Circuit will prevail.
As to the second major source of federal law, it is useful
to examine the development under the Railway Labor
Act,98 which has not been unlike that occurring under sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA. 9 Although practice here pertains
to a somewhat unique statutory context,100 "there is no
reason to assume that Congress, in accommodating the
competing interests of the union and the individual in the
enforcement of the collective agreement, would strike a
different balance because the employee was a railroad engi-
neer or airplane mechanic rather than a truck driver or
foundry man."''1 1 It is significant that at least since the
Supreme Court's 1945 decision in Elgin, Joilet & Eastern
Ry. v. Burley,'0 2 interested individuals have been recog-
nized to possess personal rights in relation to grievance
processing and to be entitled to the rights of notice, pres-
ence and counsel in proceedings conducted before the
National Railroad Adjustment Board.10 3 While this Board,
established by statute, is technically a public administra-
tive agency,104 it has a markedly "private" composition'0 5
and proceedings before it are analogous to arbitrations and
are characteristically the highest non-judicial stage in the
determination of such grievances as are brought before it. 106
that the individual was to bear his share of the costs. 40 N.J. at 87-93,
190 A. 2d at 839-42.
The plaintiff in the case before the court was unable to avail himself of
the decision in his favor, for he had failed to demand, of the collective
parties, the right to proceed pro se.
9844 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64, 181-88 (1958).
See Summers, supra note 57, at 385-88; but see commentators cited infra,
note 100.
99.Summers, supra note 57, at 385.
100 See Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 366, 371 (1955) ; Cox,
supra note 59, at 635-36; McRee, supra note 93, at 437; Williams. supra
note 93, at 272-73.
101 Summers, supra note 57, at 376.
1-2325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
103 See ibid; Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M1. Ry.,
229 F. 2d 59 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 997 (1956) ; Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Templeton, 181 F. 2d 527 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 823 (1950) ; Hunter v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 171 F. 2d 594 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 916 (1949) ; Estes v. Union Terminal Co.,
89 F. 2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. 2d 481 (7th Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 673 (1955) (lower court decisions discussed
but not passed upon) ; 1 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.11 (1958).
104 See 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1958) ; Hornsby v. Dobard,
291 F. 2d 483 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 176 F. 2d 755(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 885 (1949) ; 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 8.11 (1958).
05 See 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153(a)-(g) (1958).
100 See 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153(i)-(q) (1958).
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Although section 9(a) and the experience under the
Railway Labor Act provide useful references for the gen-
eral development of the rights of individual workers in
the total grievance process, so far as individual participa-
tion in arbitration is concerned, by far the most relevant
federal source of law is to be found not in explicit statu-
tory provisions but in the well declared policy that favors
and promotes contractual arbitration as the central facet
in the institutional "private ordering" that is collective
bargaining.
ARBITRATION - THE TOUCH-STONE OF
INDUSTRIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
Most grievances are necessarily settled at informal and
low bureaucratic levels."' The more troublesome and sig-
nificant problems are carried up through the established
procedures - each stage becoming more formal' - which
almost universally culminate in some form of arbitration
before a neutral arbitrator or a multi-partied board with
a neutral chairman.10 9 Although it is generally cheaper than
litigation or economic contest, arbitration is still a rather
expensive process"0 and perhaps for that reason, as well as
the desires of the collective parties generally to settle their
own disputes if at all possible, it is comparatively rarely
used."' Nevertheless, the arbitration process is of great
107 See Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 NJ. 61, 91, 190 A. 2d 82.5, 841
(1963): KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT: THE POWER OF
INDUSTRIAL WORK GROUPS 26 (1961); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agree-
ment, 69 HAiv. L. Rv. 601, 629 (1956) ; Kotin, Labor Agreements in Collec-
tive Bargaining, 6 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. LAB. 1, 11 (1953).
los See KUHN, supra niote 107, at 6-7, quoted in text note 45 supra;
SLICI TER, et al.. THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON AIANAGEMENT
721-27 (1960) ; Rose, The Processing of Labor Grievances, 3 LAB. L.J. 612
(1952).
100 See, e.g., Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HAEv. L. REV. 999, 1008 (1955) ; Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbi-
tration or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 ;BUFALO L. Rmv. 1, 16-17
(1952).
Statistically, something over 90% of collective bargaining agreements
in -the United States contain arbitration provisions. See 76 MONTHLY LAIoR
REVIEW 261 (1953) ; SLICHTER, supra note 108, at 739; Lenhoff, supra note
94, at 4; Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. at 179, (1955).
110 "In the typical labor management arbitration case today, the
arbitrator charges at least $100 for each day of hearing and for each
day devoted to study and wrilting the award. A recent research report
of the American Arbitration Association showed, further, that in more
than 60 percent of the cases the arbitrator's fees totalled between $100
,and $300. More than $300 was charged in about a third of the cases;
in fewer than one percent was less than $100 charged."
Editorial: Controlling Costs in Labor Arbitration, 14 ARB. J. 1, 2 (continued
on 26) (1959).
111 According to the court in Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 91,
190 A. 2d 825, 841 (1963), during "the ten years between 1942 and 1952, in
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importance to the integrity of collective bargaining, for
realistically it is the substitute, to which the collective
parties have agreed, for economic contests and substantive
litigation.112 Arbitration is so highly valued in this respect
that the Supreme Court has ruled that even in the absence
of an explicit no-strike clause, one will be inferred from
the existence of a general arbitration clause as its parallel." '
Arbitration is truly the touch-stone of the American
practice of industrial self-government." 4 Its importance
to industrial peace results from the fact that it is not merely
a court of last resort for the particular grievance but it is
also as much a part of the continuous collective bargaining
process as is the total grievance machinery of which it is
the apex. It is through the office of arbitration that the
collective parties submit themselves to an internal rule of
law, for it is in large measure the arbitrator's function to
complete the necessarily sketchy collective agreement and
to draw upon and to foster the continued development of
a private common law within the shop." 5 Arbitration is
thus simultaneously both the highest stage in the ma-
chinery to resolve individual grievances and the highest
stage in such collective bargaining as continues during the
period after the negotiation of the existing written agree-
ment and until the negotiation of the next one.
The centrality of arbitration is well reflected in the
decisions of the Supreme Court. In the Lincoln Mills"0
case the Court ruled that arbitration clauses are specifically
enforceable in suits brought under section 301. Only a few
years later the Court took significant steps, in a trio of
cases now known as the Steelworkers Trilogy,"7 to assure
the relationship between Bethlehem Steel Company and United Steelworkers
of America, involving more than 75,000 employees, of 17,000 written griev-
ances only 1,000, or an average of 100 a year, were decided finally by an
arbitrator."
While arbitration may be rare compared to total written grievances, the
total number of annual labor arbitrations appears quite significant. It is
reported thait in 1962 "arbitrators handed down awards in more than 15,000
labor controversies and wrote a million words of opinion. . . . And every
year their case load increases - by 10 percent, according to the American
Arbitration Association.... ." Stessin, A New Look at Arbitration. NEW
YoRK TinEs MAGAZINE 26, col. 2 (November 17, 1963).
1,- See note 34 supra.
113 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
11 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
577-82 (1960) ; Shulman, supra note 109; Summers, supra note 109.
"' See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 114.
116353 U.S. 448 (1957).
1" United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See Welling-
ton, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471
(1962).
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the private self-governing status of collective bargaining
by promoting the predominance of arbitration and thereby
limiting the possible incidence of substantive judicial re-
view of alleged breaches of collective agreements. In the
Court's view the realities of collective bargaining make it
obvious that arbitration provides more appropriate general
supervision than would extensive independent judicial re-
view. As Justice Douglas stated:
"The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined
to the express provisions of the contract, as the indus-
trial common law - the practices of the industry and
the shop - is equally a part of the collective agree-
ment although not expressed in it. The labor arbitra-
tor is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence
in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract
as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his
judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only
what the contract says but, insofar as the collective
bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the
effect upon productivity of a particular result, its con-
sequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For
the parties' objective in using the arbitration process
is primarily to further their common goal of uninter-
rupted production under the agreement, to make the
agreement serve their specialized needs. The ablest
judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience
and competence to bear upon the determination of a
grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed."" 8
In the Steelworkers Trilogy the Court spared no effort
in making it evident that the major role in the arbitral
process is to be played by the arbitrators rather than by
the courts. In suits to compel arbitration, or to review
arbitration awards, the function of the courts has been
narrowly limited to determine "whether the reluctant
party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to
give the arbitrator power to make the award he made. An
order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpreta-
"S United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 117, at
581-82. See also, Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. Rlv.
1482, 1493-98 (1959); Fuller, Collective BargainiNg and the Arbitrator,
1963 Wis. L. REv. 3; Shulman, snpra note 109, at 1008-11; Summers, supra
note 109, at 15-16.
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tion that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage." 119 It has further been made
clear that neither before arbitration is ordered nor upon
review of an arbitration award are the courts to review
the merits of a grievance. 120
Although it is clear that an important policy decision
has been made in favor of self, or arbitral, as opposed to
public, or judicial-administrative, ordering in the enforce-
ment of collective agreements, the Steelworkers Trilogy
and the cases following it need not be construed as an
abdication of public role in relation to the adjunctive mold-
ing of acceptable arbitral processes. And, as prologue to
consideration of the forms and implications of appropriate
procedural structuring of arbitration, it is useful to describe
the status enjoyed by individual workers in arbitration as
it was defined in the various cases that addressed the rele-
vant issues prior to the Supreme Court's past term. Many
of the decisions in the past were those of state judges decid-
ing cases according to state law. Although it appears that
federal law, implementing the federal policy embodied in
the national labor statutes, is to govern the status of in-
dividuals in arbitration, these state cases are still instruc-
tive and must be considered to the extent that they illumi-
nate the social problems that are involved and develop and
analyze competing policies, approaches and potential solu-
tions. In its declaration of how federal law is to be created
under section 301, the Supreme Court, in fact, specifically
recognized that a role is to be played by existing state law,
and asserted that "state law, if compatible with the purpose
119 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-
83 (1960).
120 As to judicial review before arbitration see United Packinghouse
Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964) ; Drake Bakeries.
Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962) ; United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) ; United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 119. As to review of an
arbitration award: See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1960).
The National Labor Relations Board has evidenced a similar deference
for arbitration. If an issue raised in an unfair labor practice proceeding
has been resolved in arbitration which was fair and regular, and all parties
had agreed to be bound, and the award was not clearly repugnant to the
NLRA, the Board will refuse to adjudicate the same issue in the unfair
labor practice proceeding, even if it might have reached a different decision
on the same facts. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). Discussed
in Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Micm. L. REV.
1435, 1514-17 (1963).
In further deference to the arbitrator, the Supreme Court recently refused
to draw a distinction between substantive and procedural issues in arbitra-
tion and held that the arbitrator, not the courts, is to decide whether the
procedural prerequisites to arbitration have been met. John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555-59 (1964).
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of section 301 may be resorted to in order to find the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy.... Any state
law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and
will not be an independent source of private rights."'21
INDIVIDUALS IN ARBITRATION - MAJOR APPROACHES
UNDER STATE LAW
It has generally been held that an individual worker
cannot compel arbitration of his grievance unless he can
demonstrate that his right to do so arises from the collec-
tive agreement itself,'22 but collective agreements do not
often anticipate this problem. Since "the grievance and
arbitration clauses normally refer only to the collective
parties,"'23 they are probably most susceptible to interpre-
tations that deny the individual the right to invoke the
process; but they probably could also be interpreted by
willing courts to provide access to individuals.'24 Courts,
generally operating under state law, have for the most part,
however, been unwilling to read collective agreements as
favoring individual participation. 25 As already noted, the
most recent decisions fully treating this question, as gov-
erned by federal law, have been in the Second Circuit 126
and New Jersey. 27 The Second Circuit has made policy
choices and adopted a reading of section 9 (a) of the NLRA
that precludes uninvited individual invocation of arbitra-
tion. The New Jersey Supreme Court, on the other hand,
has adopted the opposing position that the best approach
121 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
122 See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F. 2d
179 (2d Cir. 1962), discussed supra note 96; Brandt v. United States Lines,
Inc., 55 L.R.R.M. 2665 (S.D. N.Y. 1964); United States v. Voges, 124 F.
Supp. 543 (E.D. N.Y. 1954) ; Terrell v. Local 758, International Ass'n of
Machinists, 141 Cal. App. 2d 17, 296 P. 2d 100 (1957) ; Arsenault v. General
Electric Co., 147 Conn. 130, 157 A. 2d 918, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960)
Traschenberger v. Celanese Corp., 34 L.R.R.M. 2305 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1954);
Remak v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 44 C.C.H. LAB. CAs. 17,340 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
1961) ; Mello v. Local 4408, United Steelworkers, 82 R.I. 105, 105 A. 2d 806
(1954). Of. Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782, 792 (D. Md.
1959). aff'd, 273 F. 2d 614, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 859 (1960).
123 Summers. Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362, 369 n. 40 (1962). Accord, Williams, supra note 93,
at 273; Report, supra note 10, in 50 Nw. U.L. Rnv. at 179 (1955).
1"I See Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. 117, 139 A. 2d 611 (1958)
Ragliarone v. Consolidated Film Indus., Inc., 20 N.J. Misc. 193, 26 A. 2d 425
(Cir. Ct. 1942) ; General Cable Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. 443, 444-45 (Hays 1953) :
Riley Stoker Corp., 7 Lab. Arb. 764, 768 (Platt 1947); Michigan Steel
Casting Co., 6 Lab. Arb. 678, 680 (Platt 1947).
"I See cases cited note 122 supra.
"" Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F. 2d 179
(2d Cir. 1962) discussed note 96, supra.
127 Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A. 2d 825 (1963). Dis-
cussed note 97 supra.
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in this area is to read section 9 (a) as giving the individual
a non-defeasible right of his own to call forth arbitration.
Until faced squarely by the Supreme Court, the question
will remain unsettled.12 This entire area is, in fact, in a
furious state of development and flux. And once one is
beyond the difficult problem of compelling arbitration and
faced with situations in which the union has decided to
take a grievance to arbitration, the extent of the individual's
procedural rights becomes, if anything, even less clear.
For many years the law of New York was especially
uncertain in this regard. Although the Court of Appeals
for a long time had no occasion to pass upon any cases in
which the rights of individuals in arbitration were involved,
the lower courts did decide many such cases. Sometimes
it was concluded that individuals were entitled to proce-
dural rights in relation to arbitration,129 and sometimes it
was held that they were not so entitled. 3 ° Beginning in 1959
the New York Court of Appeals took steps to clarify the
legal posture of the individual in this area.
"21 Two commentators have indicated that they think that the issue has
already been settled and that the collective parties, who can agree that
some procedure other than arbitration shall be final, can agree to exclude
individuals from invoking arbitration. See Report of the Committee on
Individual Rights in The Collective Bargaining Relationship, ABA Section
of Labor Relations Law 164, 165-66 (1963), discussing, General Drivers.
Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963) ; Barbash, Due Process and
Individual Rights in Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNF. LAB. n. 62 (1964
as yet unpublished), discussing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 347-48
(1964) (by implication). And see id., 375 U.S. at 351 where the Riss case,
supra, is cited for the proposition that "The decision of the committee,
reached after proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and bind-
ing upon the parties, just as the contract says it is."
As these gentlemen do make persuasive arguments, it can only be sug-
gested that the Court has not yet clearly faced the issues and in the light
of recent developments it might find it useful not to extend the implications
of those cases to embody such a sweeping rule.
121 See Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 170 Misc.
482, 10 N.Y*S. 2d 519 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Application of American Machine &
Foundry Co., 193 Misc. 990, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Matter of
Carolyn Laundry, 129 N.Y. L.J. 2035, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 17, 1953) ;
Donato v. American Locomotive Oo., 283 App. Div. 410, 416, 127 N.Y.S. 2d
709, 715 (3rd Dep't) (dictum), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E. 2d 227
(1954) ; Matter of Iroquois Beverage Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 290, 159 N.Y.S. 2d
256 (Sup. Ct. 1955), noted, 66 YALE L.J. 946 (1957) ; Trimarchi v. Sheffield
Farms Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 741 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (dictum).
11o See I. Miller & Sons v. United Office & Professional Workers, 195 Misc.
20, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; Newspaper & Mail Delivery Union v.
Newark Newsdealers Supply Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950):
Weisler v. Burns, 278 App. Div. 906, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 615 (1st Dep't), aff'd
on other grounds. 303 N.Y. 657, 101 N.E. 2d (1951) ; Curtis v. New York
World-Telegram Corp., 282 App. Div. 183, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 825 (1st Dep't
1953) ; Darrell v. Neushaefer, Inc., 22 Iab. Arb. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) ;
Cuff v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 134 N.Y. L.J. No. 70, p. 6, col. 7 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1955) ; General Warehousemen's Union, Local 852 v. Glidden Co.,
9 Misc. 2d 648, 169 N.Y.S. 2d 759 (Sup. Ct. 1957), Cf. Golden Eagle Life
Insr. Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. 103 (N.Y. Arb. 1951).
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In a far reaching decision, Parker v. Borock,131 the court
held that an individual worker could not sue his employer
to remedy alleged violations of rights that admittedly
inured to his benefit under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Suit was brought against an employer by a dis-
charged employee whose union had refused to take his
grievance to arbitration. In an earlier proceeding it had
been held that the employee could not compel arbitration,
"purely a Union right. ' 132 In the suit against his employer
for damages, the New York Court of Appeals held that he
also had no right to proceed against the employer. The
majority's position was that "[A] reading of the existing
agreement indicates that plaintiff has entrusted his rights
to his union representative. It may be that the union failed
to preserve them. . . . '[T]he only conclusion which logi-
cally follows is that the employee is without any remedy,
except as against his own union. . . . "'3 In other words,
according to the New York court, the individual's only
remedy, when his union refuses to take a grievance to arbi-
tration, is to bring suit against the union for violation of its
fiduciary duty of fair representation.'
Having gone this far, the Court of Appeals, in the case
of In re Soto,135 then settled the conflict that had existed in
the lower courts as to the rights available to individuals
in relation to arbitration proceedings that a union has
elected to initiate.
A number of employees represented by Local 122 of
the National Jewelry Workers Union, who were being paid
$42.00 a week, joined Local 810 of the Teamsters Union out
of dissatisfaction with the local of the National Jewelry
Workers. A wildcat strike took place, but it was enjoined
and the striking employees returned to work. The em-
131 5 N.Y. 2d 156, 156 N.E. 2d 297, 182 N.Y.S. 2d 577 (1959).
112 United States v. Voges, 124 F. Supp. 543, 546 (E.D. N.Y. 1954).
13 5 N.Y. 2d at 161, 156 N.E. 2d at 300, 182 N.Y.S. 2d at 581, quoting
Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 417, 127 N.Y.S.
2d 709, 716 (3rd Dep't), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E. 227 (1954).
There was one other proceeding in Parker prior to this final disposition.
The employer originally sought, but failed, to avoid suit by moving to stay
pending arbitration - this was after the union had refused to go to arbitra-
tion and the federal district court held the individual could not compel it.
See 136 N.Y.S. 2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 286 App. Div. 851, 141
N.Y.S. 2d 359 (2d Dep't 1955), appeal dismissed, 4 N.Y. 2d 731, 148 N.E. 2d
324, 171 N.Y.S. 2d 118 (1958) (Mem.).
"I Judge Fuld, concurring, stated that "absent specific language giving
the employee the right to act on his own behalf ... the union alone has a
right to control the prosecution of discharge cases. . . . [T]he employee
has a remedy against the union for breach of fiduciary dulty if it unfairly
discriminated against him." 5 N.Y. 2d at 162, 156 N.E. 2d at 300, 182
N.Y.S. 2d at 582.
131 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 165 N.E. 2d 855, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 282 (1960).
GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION
ployer, however, then accused some of these employees of
engaging in a slowdown. Local 122 was notified by the
employer of its intention to discharge several workers.
The union requested arbitration and a couple of hours
before the hearing the employees to be discharged received
notice of its time and place and were informed that they
could appear and be heard. Accompanied by their own
attorney, (counsel for Local 810), who requested an ad-
journment and leave to represent them, they attended the
scheduled hearing. After an adjournment of three days
the arbitrator ruled that independent counsel could not
represent the grievants because Local 122 was the exclusive
bargaining agent under the collective agreement and its
counsel alone would therefore conduct the hearing for the
dischargees. This ruling was made in spite of the fact that
the arbitrator had been informed that Local 122's lawyer at
the arbitration had represented the employer in the pro-
ceedings to enjoin the wildcat strike and to hold the officers
of Local 810 in contempt because of the alleged slowdown.
Insisting that his clients were thus being denied counsel,
the attorney for the discharged employees announced that
they, consequently, would not appear at the hearing. The
employer put on his case at the hearing and when counsel
for Local 122 interposed no defense, the arbitrator was
constrained to uphold the discharges.13 6
An action to vacate the award was then brought by
the aggrieved employees. Under the circumstances of the
case, vacatur was granted by the lower courts on the
ground that meaningful intervention should have been
granted in the arbitration, for it was otherwise impossible
for the grievants to have their position adequately repre-
sented.'3 7 Reversing, a divided Court of Appeals held that
since these individuals were not parties to the collective
agreement and were not granted the right to intervene
by that agreement, they were not parties to the arbitration
and therefore they did not have the requisite status, under
the New York Arbitration Statute, to initiate a proceeding
186 There is no specific indication that the arbitrator knowingly ratified
a decision that had been agreed between union and company before arbi-
tration had been undertaken. There are, however, instances in which such
use is made of the arbitral process. Union and management having agreed
to the disposition of a matter, desire or need the "neutral" arbitrator's
imprimatur. The arbitrator who agrees to such action has been said to
prostitute his position. Such practice, which is reported to be declining,
has been sharply criticized. See Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process
and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REv. 235, 248-51
(1961) ; Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv.
3, 18-22 (1963).
"1 7 App. Div. 2d 1, 180 N.Y.S. 2d 388 (1st Dep't 1958).
26519641
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
for an order to vacate the arbitration award. The court
concluded its decision by stating that ". . . an employee is
not foreclosed, in an appropriate case, from pursuing any
remedy at law that might be available for breach of
fiduciary duty owing by the union."' 38 Thus, under New
York law, even when a union elected to initiate arbitra-
tion and then proceeded in an unfair manner, an individual
only had recourse to such remedy as was provided by a
suit at law based upon the union's breach of its fiduciary
obligation.139
Shortly after the Soto decision, the single and limited
right of an aggrieved worker to proceed against his union
for breach of its fiduciary duty was further attenuated by
an appellate division ruling. Building upon the antedi-
luvian concept that a labor union - a voluntary associa-
tion - is not an entity distinct from its membership and,
therefore, cannot be sued in its own name or by a mem-
ber,140 the court held that a union could be held liable for
such a breach "only if the cause of action is provable
against each and every member of the association."''
No other jurisdiction has consumed so many pages of
its case reports in examining the status to be enjoyed by
individuals in arbitrations that a union elects to initiate as
" 7 N.Y. 2d at 400, 165 N.E. 2d at 856, 198 N.Y.S. 2d at 283-84.
189 The broad sweep of Soto was extended, and also upheld against con-
stitutional argument, in Chuplia v. Lorenz-Schneider Co., 12 N.Y. 2d 1, 186
N.E. 2d 191, 233 N.Y.S. 2d 929 (1962), appeal disMissed for lack of a SuO-
stantial federal question, 372 U.S. 227 (1963).
Four individuals, former employees of the Lorenz-Schneider Company,
had purchased commercial routes from the company. The union, taking the
position that the sale violated the collective agreement, took the matter
to arbitration. The four individuals were not parties to the arbitration
where it was held that the union's interpretation was correct and it was
ordered that the four routes be restored to the coverage of the agreement.
The court held that since the parties were parties neither to the arbitration
nor to the collective agreement, they had no standing to seek vacatur
of the award.
It is further noteworthy that the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit appear to accord with the Parker-Soto
trend. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.
2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Belk v. Allied Aviation Service Co., 315 F. 2d 513
(2d Cir. 1963) ; Brandt v. United States Lines, Inc., 55 L.R.R.M. 2665 (S.D.
N.Y. 1964).
1" As to assaults on the entity problem see, e.g., Fray v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters Union, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W. 2d 782 (1960); Donnelly v.
United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A. 2d 825 (1963) ; Marshall v. Inter-
national Longshoremen Local 6, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P. 2d
987 (1962) ; Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 510-13 (1962);
Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 712 (1957).
141 Saint v. Pope, 12 App. Div. 2d 168, 171, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 9, 11 (4th Dep't
1961). See Prin v. Deluca, 218 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961). A suit
brought by Saint against the employer had already been dismissed on the
authority of Parker v. Boroek. See Saint v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 12 App.
Div. 871, 210 N.Y.S. 2d 999 (4th Dep't 1961) (Mem.).
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has New York; indeed, very few states have significantly
touched upon these problems.
The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors had occasion,
in 1960, to decide that individual employees, not parties
to or contemplated by collective bargaining agreements,
could not compel arbitration; 42 similarly they did not have
standing to move a court to vacate an arbitration award.14 3
The Connecticut Court, however, had been known to find
an intent in the words of an arbitration clause to permit an
individual to invoke arbitration on his own behalf.' The
1960 decisions, moreover, did not go as far as those in New
York and declare that the aggrieved employee's remedy
included no action against the employer and was limited to
an action at law against the union for breach of its fiduciary
duty.
Maryland, also rejected the full force of the drastic
New York approach. In its leading decision, the Maryland
Court of Appeals permitted an individual a suit for wrong-
ful discharge against her employer and her union when
"the Union acted arbitrarily and in a discriminatory man-
ner in refusing to press the plaintiff's grievance to arbitra-
tion under the agreement.' 14 5 Michigan appears, on the
other hand, to have adopted more of the total New York
approach.14
6
The Pennsylvania decisions were rather clearly in the
New York camp. In Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 47 an
aggrieved employee, who allegedly was laid off by the
company while other employees with less seniority than
he were not, and who was later expelled from his union,
brought suit against his employer and union officials for
the first affront, and against the union for the second. His
claim for wrongful expulsion was decided against him on
142 Arsenault v. General Electric Co., 147 Conn. 130, 157 A. 2d 918, cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
"I McCaffrey v. United Aircraft Corp., 147 Conn. 139, 157 A. 2d 920, cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 854 (1960).
114 Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. 117, 139 A. 21 611 (1958).
145 Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 576, 144 A.
2d 88, 99 (1958). See Stremich v. Abell Co., 43 L.R.R.M. 2139 (Baltimore
City People's Ot. 1958) ; but 8ee Henthorn v. Western Maryland Ry., 226
Md. 499, 174 A. 2d 175 (1961) ; Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Raynor, 220 Md.
501, 154 A. 2d 814 (1959) ; Traschenberger v. Celanese Corp., 34 L.R.R.M.
2305 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1954).
14 See Cortez v. Ford Miotor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W. 2d 523 (1957).
More recently, as it became more apparent that federal law is to govern
under § 301, the Michigan Court has given indications of being receptive
to individual use of grievance machinery. See Ries v. Evening News Ass'n,
370 Mich. 614, 122 N.W. 2d 663 (1963); Pennington v. Whiting Tubular
Products, Inc., 370 Mich. 590, 122 N.W. 2d 692 (1963).
1'7 400 Pa. 145, 161 A. 2d 882 (1960).
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the ground that he had failed to exhaust his internal union
remedies. On the wrongful discharge claim, it was held,
following Parker v. Borock,4 8 that the employee could
bring no action against the employer and that his only
remedy was a suit against the union for breach of its
fiduciary obligation. The court reasoned that, as a matter
of contract law - under the existing collective agree-
ment - and as a matter of sound labor relations policy,
only the union could be permitted to prosecute a grievance.
The court further refused to consider whether the union
had breached its fiduciary duty of fair representation in
failing to prosecute plaintiff's grievance. This time plain-
tiff was thrown out of court on the technicality that he had
misjoined the union officials rather than the union itself
in that cause of action.14 9 There seemed to be no question
but that a proper suit against the union could be joined
without entity problems being encountered.
In Bailer v. Local 470, Teamsters, 50 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court bought another large portion of the New
York approach. Plaintiff, a member of the Teamsters
Union, seconded a motion in 1957 that his Local oppose
the election of James Hoffa as President of the Interna-
tional. Officers of the Local did not permit the member-
ship to vote on the motion and the moving party was
advised that, regardless of membership opinion to the con-
trary, the Local's vote would be cast for Hoffa. Later plain-
tiff and other members circulated a petition embodying
a request to an intermediate union supervisory body to
assure that the Local Officers administered the affairs and
meetings of the Local in a democratic fashion. The day
that Hoffa was elected International President, plaintiff
was fired from the job that he had held for seven years,
allegedly for circulating the petition during business hours.
Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Local. Although the
shop steward did nothing, the Local submitted the griev-
ance to arbitration. However, plaintiff's request that inde-
pendent counsel represent him at the arbitration was re-
jected. Subsequently the arbitration award went against
him. The court held that plaintiff failed to prove a claim,
under the Falsetti decision, for breach of the union's duty
of fair representation. As to plaintiff's request that he be
represented at the arbitration hearing by his own lawyer,
141 See notes 131-34 supra and accompanying texit.
140 Evidently Falsetti was not completely discouraged. He was recently
held by a federal district court to be entitled to a trial on similar claims
raised under § 301 of the LMRA. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UAW, 55 L.R.R.M.
2552 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
150 400 Pa. 188, 161 A. 2d 343 (1960).
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the court held that the request was properly denied since
the Local was the exclusive bargaining agent with the com-
pany. Thus, in Pennsylvania as in New York, even when a
union elected to initiate arbitration, an individual's only
recourse against possible unfairness was to such remedy
as was provided by a suit at law based upon the union's
breach of its fiduciary obligation.
In Wisconsin the judicial climate has been much more
favorable to the individual. First, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court squarely held that, when faced with a hostile union
opposing their interests, aggrieved workers could sue their
employer to secure contract benefits that were "clearly for
the benefit of the individual employee," despite the fact
that the collective agreement expressly provided that the
grievance and arbitration processes "shall be the sole
means of disposing of grievance."'' Second, the court held
that a labor union is an entity, separate from its member-
ship, for the purposes of a suit by a member for breach of
its fiduciary obligation.152
The Wisconsin Court occupied its most advanced posi-
tion in Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp.15 3 This case involved a
seniority dispute. A group of employees, with extensive
seniority as production workers, were promoted to super-
visory positions. Later, when the company retrenched, they
were returned to production jobs and consequently to the
bargaining unit. In calculating their seniority in produc-
tion jobs, issue was joined over whether time served as
supervisors should be included. The company, backing the
former supervisors, argued for inclusion, while the union
opposed. Siding with employees who had been laid off to
make room for the former supervisors, the union filed a
grievance and processed it to arbitration. None of the de-
moted employees, however, was notified of the arbitration
proceedings and none was present or participated. When
the arbitrator upheld the union's position, some of the
former supervisors brought suit to vacate the award.
Recognizing a general rule that courts should not inter-
fere with the arbitration process, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was, nevertheless, of the opinion that an exception
was warranted in this case:
151 Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 500, 82 N.W. 2d 172,
174 (1957).
"I Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W. 2d 782
(1960) ; Note, 13 STAN. L. REv. 123 (1960).
138 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277,
100 N.W. 2d 317, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960). Noted, 44 MARQ. L. REV.
115 (1960) ; 58 MICH. L. REv. 796 (1960) ; 13 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1960);
46 VA. L. Rav. 802 (1960) ; 1960 Wis. L. REv. 324.
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".. . where the interests of two groups of employees
are diametrically opposed to each other and the union
espouses the cause of one in the arbitration, it follows
as a matter of law that there has been no fair repre-
sentation of the other group. It is true even though,
in choosing the cause of which group to espouse, the
union acts completely objectively and with the best of
motives. The old adage that one cannot serve two mas-
ters, is particularly applicable to such a situation."154
The court's precise holding was that the arbitration award
was not binding upon the plaintiffs because they had not
been adequately represented by the union in the hearing.
The court further held that the plaintiffs' interests were
not adequately represented by the employer because sound
labor policy required that employees "should never be put
in the position of having to solely depend upon the em-
ployer's championing their rights under the collective bar-
gaining contract."'55 Correlative to these two holdings was
the court's position that the arbitration award would have
been binding had the prejudiced individuals been given the
opportunity of intervening in the arbitration hearings.
While the court seemed to be of the opinion that the plain-
tiffs' seniority rights could not be divested without due
process of law, it did not find it necessary to base its:
".... holding, that the award should be held not bind-
ing upon the plaintiffs because of lack of notice to them
of the arbitration hearing, upon lack of due process.
Courts of equity traditionally have the power to grant
relief in situations which offend the court's sense ofjustice and fair play. We are herein confronted with
a new situation in which it is incumbent upon us to
adopt such a rule of law as we deem to be in the best
interests of sound public policy. We do not believe that
the requirement of giving notice and an opportunity to
intervene, to those employees not being fairly repre-
sented in the arbitration by the union, as a condition
to the award being binding on such employees, will
prove disruptive of the arbitration process. We are
inclined to believe that in the vast majority of labor
arbitrations no question of fair representation will
ever arise."'' 5
On rehearing the court resisted the argument by the union
that the original decision interfered with it role under the
15 8 Wis. 2d at 272, 99 N.W. 2d at 137.
155 8 Wis. 2d at 275, 99 N.W. 2d at 138.
156 Ibid.
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LMRA as exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting
employee seniority rights. Citing analogous holdings under
the Railway Labor Act, the court held that "once the rights
of employees have been fixed in the collective-bargaining
contract, the union does not possess the right to barter them
away before an arbitrator. 15
7
Despite elaborate criticism of Wisconsin's extreme ap-
proach,"51 Kentucky also adopted the position that, in ad-
ministering seniority provisions of a collective agreement, a
union fails to accord group "A" fair representation if it es-
pouses the cause of group "B" whose interest is diametri-
cally opposed to that of group "A".'59 In a landmark de-
cision, Humphrey v. Moore,6" the Kentucky case was re-
viewed by the Supreme Court, and when the air had
cleared, not only had federal law been pronounced supreme,
but the extremities of both the New York and the Wis-
consin approaches had been irradicated.
HuMPaREY v. MooRE
In the Humphrey case, the question was "whether the
Kentucky Court of Appeals properly enjoined implementa-
tion of the decision of a joint employer-employee [union]
committee purporting to settle certain grievances in accord-
1578 Wis. 2d 277, 277a, 100 N.W. 2d 317, 318 (1960). The Wisconsin Court
was not prevented by the sweep of its Clark holding from finding circum-
stances in which the resolution of a seniority issue was fairly achieved.
O'Donnel v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W. 2d 484 (1961). In
another decision subsequently considering the Clark rule, the court affirmed
the dismissal of an employee's complaint against her employer because she
did not demonstrate that she should have been excused from exhausting
the remedies available under the collective agreement. Widuk v. John Oster
Mfg. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 367, 117 N.W. 2d 245 (1962).
I'l Comment on Clark has been particularly heavy, and many of those
who comment on it of course clontrast the Wisconsin approach with that of
New York in Soto. See, e.g., McRee, The Adversely Affected Employee and
the Grievance and Arbitration Process, in SYmPOSIUM ON LABOR RELATIONS
LAW 431 (Slovenko ed. 1961) ; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 363-70 (1962) ; Aaron,
Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J.
39, 49-54 (1961) ; Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Pro-
cedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236-42 (1961).
159 Moore v. Local 89, Teamsters, 356 S.W. 2d 241 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962).
See also Guzzo v. United Steelworkers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2379 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1960), cert. denied sub. nom., Smith v. Superior Court, 365 U.S. 802 (1961).
1-0 375 U.S. 335 (1964), reversing sub nom., Moore v. Local 89, Teamsters,
supra note 159. For further discussion of the Humphrey case, see Barbash,
supra note 128 (unpublished) ; Ratner, Some Contemporary Observations
on Section 301, 52 GEo. L.J. 260, 290-95 (1964) ; Rosen, Fair Representa-
tion, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Offlcials
and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 409-27
(1964) ; Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration, Individual Rights
in Grievance - Arbitration Procedure, ABA Section of Labor Relations
Law, 56 L.R.R. 418 (1964) ; Note, 5 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 848 (1964).
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ance with the terms of the collective bargaining contract.
The decision of the committee determined the relative sen-
iority rights of the employees of two companies, Dealers
* . . and E & L . ".."161
As a result of legitimate business exigencies, E & L
agreed to withdraw in favor of Dealers from the business
of transporting new automobiles and trucks from the Ford
Motor Company assembly plant at Louisville, Kentucky.
After E & L withdrew, the amount of business conducted
by Dealers decreased from the combined amount that had
been conducted by the two companies prior to the trans-
action; concomitantly there was a contraction of the total
number of available jobs.
The employees of both companies were represented by
the same union, Local 89, Teamsters. Its president, under-
standing "that the transaction between the companies in-
volved no trades, sales or exchanges of property but only a
withdrawal by E & L at the direction of the Ford Motor
Company... advised the E & L employees that their situ-
ation was precarious. When layoffs at E & L began, three
E & L employees filed grievances claiming that the senior-
ity lists of Dealers and E & L should be 'sandwiched' and
the E & L employees taken on at Dealers with the seniority
they had enjoyed at E & L."' 12 These grievances were proc-
essed by the union, but the Dealers' employees were ad-
vised by the local president or his assistant that they had
nothing to fear "since E & L employees had no contract
right to transfer under these circumstances."'63
As a result of inclusion within a single multi-employer,
multi-local union bargaining unit, almost identical collec-
tive agreements, a number of whose provisions concerned
seniority,' had been executed by Dealers and E & L.
Under this agreement, disputes were to be settled pursuant
to a multi-staged grievance procedure. Resort was made to
161 375 U.S. at 336.
162 375 U.S. at 337.
163 375 U.S. at 337.
16, "According to Art. 4, § 1 of the contract 'seniority rights for employees
shall prevail' and 'any controversy over the employees' standing on such
lists shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure .... ' 375 U.S. at
337-38.
Art. 4, § 5 provided:
"In the event that the employer absorbs the business of another
private, contract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger of lines,
the seniority of the employees absorbed or affected thereby shall be
determined by mutual agreement between the Employer and the Unions
involved. Any controversy with respect to such matter shall be sub-
mitted to the joint grievance procedure." 375 U.S. at 338.
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each higher stage if a settlement was not reached on the
preceding lower one.165
In this case, the local joint committee deadlocked over
the E & L employees' grievance, and endorsed it, over the
signature of the local president and the Dealers' representa-
tive, and referred it to the Joint Conference Committee, the
appellate board. Before that committee, having, according
to the Court, been more fully advised as to the nature of
the Dealers-E & L transaction, the local president supported
the position of the E & L employees. The Court further
found that Dealers' employees were represented at the hear-
ing before the Joint Conference Committee by three shop
stewards who, just prior to the hearing, were informed of
the local president's new position by the union. After a full
hearing the Joint Conference Committee accepted the view
of the E & L employees and determined that in accordance
with the provisions of the contract the E & L and Dealers'
employees should "be sandwiched in on master seniority
boards using the presently constituted seniority lists and
the dates contained therein .... ",166
As a consequence of this decision, a large number of
Dealers' employees were to be laid off "to provide openings
for E & L drivers" with greater seniority.16 7 Moore, an ag-
grieved Dealers' employee, brought a class action against
the union and Dealers, in a Kentucky state court, to enjoin
the execution of the Joint Conference Committee's deci-
sion or, in the alternative, to recover damages. Allegations
were made to the effect that the union had breached its
duty of fair representation, by fraudulently deceiving the
Dealers' employees, by conniving with the E & L employees
and by essentially failing to represent the Dealers' em-
ployees at all before the Joint Conference Committee. It
was further alleged that "[T]he decision of the Joint Con-
1"5 Under Article 7, grievances were first to be taken up between the
employer and the local union; next, they were to be submitted to the localjoint committee where the union and employer are equally represented. The
last stage in the grievance procedure was consideration by "the Automobile
Transporters Joint Conference Committee upon which the employers and
the unions in the overall bargaining had an equal number of representa-
tives." The contract, by Article 7(d), made it quite clear that the Joint
Conference Committee had jurisdiction to hear "all matters pertaining to
the interpretation of any provision of [the] Agreement, whether requested
by the Employer or the Union. ... If it was able to make a decision,
"after listening to testimony of both sides," its decision was to be "'final
and conclusive and binding upon the employer and the union, and the em-ployees involved'." In the event the Joint Conference Committee was unable
to come to a decision, on a dispute, provision was made for arbitration.
375 U.S. at 338.
168 375 U.S. at 339.
167 375 U.S. at 339.
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ference Board was . . . arbitrary and capricious, contrary
to existing practice in the industry and violative of the
collective bargaining contract."'68
Seemingly deciding the issues under state substantive
law, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the con-
tract provision relied upon by the Joint Conference Com-
mittee was inapplicable and that the decision of the com-
mittee was therefore not binding. Reminiscent of the Wis-
consin approach, the court further concluded that in the
circumstances of the case, representation of the two antag-
onistic interests by a single advocate, the union (which
had, according to the court, an interest of its own - en-
hancement of union power), rendered the committee's de-
cision invalid as being "arbitrary and violative of natural
justice."'169 In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme
Court took a somewhat different view of the case.
In the first place, while agreeing that this was "an action
to enforce a collective bargaining contract,"'' ° the Supreme
Court held that the issues raised, although justiciable in the
state courts, were to be decided strictly according to fed-
eral, not state, law under section 301 of the LIRA.
The Court construed the pleadings to raise two separate
but related claims: a direct cause of action against both
union and management, for breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and, also against both collective parties,
a cause for violation of the duty of fair representation
which also constituted a breach of the collective agree-
ment.1
7 1
After concluding that the plaintiff was properly in
court, the Supreme Court then held that he failed to prove
his case.
18 375 U.S. at 340.
169 356 S.W. 2d at 246.
170 375 U.S. at 341.
1'7 By this holding the Court was able to avoid the questioDn whether a
violation of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under
the LMRA and therefore within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board. Ex Parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962);
In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); San Diego 'Bldg. Trades Council v.
Gormon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). This is because "even if it is, or arguably
may be, an unfair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore's
discharge would violate the contract and was therefore within the cogniz-
ance of federal and state courts, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, [371 U.S.
195 (1962)].... ." 375 U.S. at 344. Thus, regardless of whether the
statutory duty of fair representation is pre-empted, the courts will be able
to entertain suits under the contractual duty. See Report of the Committee
on Labor Arbitration, note 160 supra. The statutory duty is discussed in
note 41 supra.
The National Labor Relations Board decisions dealing with the failure
of individuals to be accorded fair representation are discussed infra, notes
229-42 with accompanying text.
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First, the Court addressed itself to the question whether
the Joint Conference Committee's decision was in violation
of or unauthorized by the collective agreement and was
therefore invalid. In disposing of this question, the Court
did not squarely resolve the plaintiff's contention that col-
lective parties are limited, in grievance proceedings, by the
precise terms of the existing agreement. Instead, observing
that the collective parties themselves purported to act in
accordance with the provisions of the agreement, 7 2 it re-
viewed the Joint Committee's actual construction of the
agreement and held that the decision of the Joint Commit-
tee was not in violation of any of its provisions and its
action was in fact empowered by the agreement. The
strong implication can be drawn from the Court's approach
that the parties are bound by their prior existing agreement
until formally changed by amendment or negotiation of a
new agreement. 173 In the view of Justice Goldberg, who
11 See note 161 supra and accompanying text. The court specifically
reserved judgment on the problems that would have been "posed if § 5
[see note 164 8upra] had been omitted from the contract or if the parties
had acted to amend the provision." The Court further stated that "Even
in the absence of § 5, however, it would be necessary to deal with the
alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representation." 375 U.S. at
345 n. 7.
Except for this last sentence, Ratner suggests that:
" .. if what the parties say they are doing is controlling, they can
be trusted to find suitable language to avoid undue judicial interfer-
ence. Just as Burley was met by amendment of union constitutions
and bylaws, so Moore will be met by a change in the language of
grievance dispositions. Instead of casting the result solely in terms of
interpretation or application of the contract, the parties will reach
their decision also by amending the contract and announce that the
contract is simultaneously amended in accordance with the result. Like
the Rule in Shelley's Case, the effect of Moore will be to add a few
words to official documents." Ratner, 8Upra note 160, at 293. Cf. ILWU
v. Kuntz, 56 L.R.R.M. 2708 (9th Cir. 1964).
In view of the technical differences between contract formation and con-
tract administration, see note 58 supra, the collective parties might find
avoidance of Humphrey more trouble than it is worth and there is no
reason to expect that the courts would be taken in by such subterfuge. And,
of course, there would still be the action for breach of the duty of fair
representation.
173 In a footnote the court specifically said that "Reconciliation of these
two provisions [§ 5, see note 164 supra and Art. 7(d), see note 165 supra],
going to the power of the committee under the contract, itself presented an
issue ultimately for the court, not the committee, to decide." 375 U.S. at
345 n. 8 (continued on 346).
Ratner sees two possible interpretations for this footnote and the
Court's holding:
"The opinion may 'be read as holding that where contracting parties
purport to be interpreting or applying their contract as written, the
courts, rather than they, have the final word as to what the contract
means.... On the other hand, a narrower reading may be warranted.
For the discussion is addressed to the proposition that the committee
exceeded powers conferred upon it by the contracting parties, not that
the contracting parties could not legally have conferred such power
upon 'the committee, or legally have such power exercised themselves.
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concurred only in the result,174 this treatment of the issue
was as much as a holding to that effect.175
Having disposed of the first, or what may be called the
true contract action, the Court next considered whether the
union's conduct, impliedly ratified by the employer who
was found to be neutral on this grievance, 176 constituted a
violation of its duty of fair representation. At the outset,
the Court found that there was no "adequate support in this
record for the complainant's attack upon the integrity of the
union and of the procedures which led to its decision"'17
and that there was "insufficient proof of dishonesty or in-
tentional misleading on the part of the union.' 7 8 Then the
Court rejected the view of the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky (and the Wisconsin Supreme Court) 179 that the
union's representation of two antagonistic interests (or,
more properly, its failure or practical inability to represent
both interests simultaneously) rendered the Joint Com-
mittee's decision invalid. Relying upon Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman,8 0 the Court held that in grievance proceedings,
just as in contract negotiation and amendment, there is no
"breach of the collective bargaining agent's duty of fair
representation in taking a good faith position contrary to
that of some individuals whom it represents nor in support-
The narrower interpretation may well be intended, for the opinion
does not assert that parties to a collective bargaining contract are, or
explain why they should be, denied the liberty contracting parties
normally enjoy to 'agree as to meaning'."
Ratner, supra note 160, at 292. 'See discussion note 128 supra; B arbash,
supra note 128, at his note 61.
-Of course, either view leads to some general expansion of individual
rights, but the first is the one more favorable to the individual and the
one that the author prefers as will appear more clearly.
174 Justice Goldberg was joined by Justice Brennan. 375 U.S. at 351.
Justice Douglas, concurring separately, agreed with Justice Goldberg's
reasons for concluding that the litigation was properly brought in the
state court, but agreed with the majority's reasons for concluding that on
the merits no cause of action had been made out. 375 U.S. at 351.
Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with
the majority as to the true cause of action for breach of contract, but
agreed with Justice Goldberg, on the facts, that the fair representation
cause in this case did not fall within § 301. He further was of the opinion
,that the case should have been reversed and remanded for careful con-
sideration of whether the National Labor Relations 'Board had primary
jurisdiction over the unfair representation claim. 375 U.S. at 359.
175 375 U.S. at 353-54, quoted in text, infra, note 188.
10 375 U.S. at 343; see Note, 5 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 848, 853
n. 25 (1964) (quoting from the Brief for Respondents, pp. 5-6).
177 375 U.S. at 348.
178 375 U.S. alt 349.
171 See Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., cited and discussed notes 153-58 supra
with accompanying text.
180 345. U.S. 330 (1952). This case involved an alleged breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation when a company and a union formally
amended an existing collective in such a manner as to derogate the seniority
of some employees.
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ing the position of one group of employees against that of
another,"'' 1 for,
"Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivo-
lous grievances which would only clog the grievance
process, so it must be free to take a position on the not
so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized
when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employ-
ees. Conflict between employees represented by the
same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the
union in these cases would surely weaken the collective
bargaining and grievance processes.' 18 2
A final question considered by the majority was whether
the aggrieved Dealers' employees were "deprived of a fair
hearing by having inadequate representation at the hear-
ing" before the Joint Conference Committee, since the
union opposed their position.8 3 The Court implied that at
least in circumstances such as those before it, where the
union could not possibly represent all the conflicting views
of contending employees, there may be some requirement,
under the duty of fair representation, that dissident em-
ployees receive separate and adequate notice of and repre-
sentation at the grievance proceeding."8 4 The Court did not
define the scope of such a requirement. It did note, how-
ever, that the Dealers' employees had notice of the hearing,
were aware of the controversy and were in fact represented
at the hearing, at union expense, by three stewards who
"were given every opportunity to state their position."'8 5
Observing that "the Dealers' employees made no request to
continue the hearing until they could secure further repre-
sentation and have not yet suggested what they could have
added to the hearing by way of facts or theory if they had
been differently represented,' 18 6 the Court concluded that
there was no indication that a different representation
would have altered the result. This portion of the majority
opinion no doubt induced Justice Goldberg's statement that
"trial-type hearing standards . .. [should not] be applied
375 U.S. at 349.
182 375 U.S. at 349-50.
375 U.S. at 350.
'1 "See Barbash, note 128 supra, at his notes 69-71.
Of course at least one other as good an implication is possible, i.e., that
"Under the Circumstances the Court thought it would be mere idle specula-
tion to say that the result would have been different had the matter been
differently presented," and therefore meant to imply nothing on the merits
of the broad question. Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration, note
160 supra, at 425 nn. 45-46. But see Justice Goldberg's exclamation of
de pair quoted in the text, note 187 infra.
11r 375 U.S. at 350.
111 375 U.S. at 350-51.
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so as to hinder the employer and the union in their joint
endeavor to adapt the collective bargaining relationship to
the exigencies of economic life."'18 7
The majority's willingness to entertain the claim that
the Joint Conference Committee's decision was in violation
of or unauthorized by the collective agreement was the first
source of disagreement for Justice Goldberg. He would
have ruled that the plaintiff could not state such a cause of
action for breach of contract under section 301 and he dis-
approvingly interpreted the majority's act in reviewing and
affirming the Joint Conference Committee's construction of
the collective agreement as essentially a holding "making
the words of the contract the exclusive source of rights and
duties" in grievance proceedings. 18 Expressing great con-
cern for the collective interests in the continuing and un-
forseeably contingent collective bargaining process, Justice
Goldberg stated his opinion that "a mutually acceptable
grievance settlement between an employer and a union,
which is what the decision of the Joint Committee was,
cannot be challenged by an individual dissenting employee
under section 301 (a) on the ground that the parties ex-
ceeded their contractual powers in making the settle-
ment."'18 9 Unlike arbitration, where the arbitrator is bound
by the collective agreement, contract provisions do not
immutably bind the collective parties. As to the instant
case, he was of the opinion that "[T]he presence of the
merger-absorption clause did not restrict the right of the
parties to resolve their dispute by joint agreement apply-
ing, interpreting, or amending the contract."'90
Turning his attention to the Court's interpretation, or
rather what he considered to be its misinterpretation, of
the duty of fair representation, he agreed that plaintiff had
proved no case. However, he rejected the holding that the
claim should be treated as one for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement supporting an action under section
301. His initial ground for disagreement was that to so base
the action constituted a break with precedent, since the
prior fair representation cases were premised upon "a duty
derived not from the collective bargaining contract but im-
plied from the union's rights and responsibilities conferred
by federal labor statutes."'' But, Justice Goldberg's real
objection to the majority position on fair representation as
187 375 U.S. at 359.
188 375 U.S. at 354.
189 375 U.S. at 352.
190 375 U.S. at 353
1 375 U.S. at 356. Historically, Justice Goldberg 'of course was correct.
See note 41 8upra.
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well as the other issues lies on the level of policy, i.e., what
rights should the individual have in collective bargaining.
Because of the way he views the social interests in collec-
tive bargaining, Justice Goldberg would firmly strike a
balance in favor of the collective parties and maximum
flexibility in their relations. The only relief he seems will-
ing to allow the individual from collective power is that
which was allowed under the law of New York and Penn-
sylvania - such relief as may be available in a suit at law
against the union for breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion. The last paragraph of his opinion especially clarifies
his position:
"[I]n this Court's fashioning of a federal law of collec-
tive bargaining, it is of the utmost importance that the
law reflect the realities of industrial life and the nature
of the collective bargaining process. We should not
assume that doctrines evolved in other contexts will
be equally well adapted to the collective bargaining
process. Of course, we must protect the rights of the
individual. It must not be forgotten, however, that
many individual rights, such as the seniority rights
involved in this case, in fact arise from the concerted
exercise of the right to bargain collectively. Conse-
quently, the understandable desire to protect the indi-
vidual should not emasculate the right to bargain by
placing undue restraints upon the contracting parties.
Similarly, in safeguarding the individual against the
misconduct of the bargaining agent, we must recognize
that the employer's interests are inevitably involved
whenever the labor contract is set aside in order to
vindicate the individual's right against the union. The
employer's interest should not be lightly denied where
there are other remedies available to insure that a
union will respect the rights of its constituents. Nor
should trial-type hearing standards or conceptions of
vested contractual rights be applied so as to hinder the
employer and the union in their joint endeavor to adapt
the collective bargaining relationship to the exigencies
of economic life.'1 92
But the majority of the Supreme Court appears to have
rejected Justice Goldberg's and New York's position by de-
claring that individuals shall have recourse to federal ac-
tions not only against unions for breach of the duty of fair
representation but also against the collective parties for
192 375 U.S. at 358-59.
1964] 279
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
violating the terms of the collective agreement, and further
by possibly implying that individuals may sometimes be
legally entitled to participate personally in the grievance
process.
GROUP V. INDimuAL: A PARTIAL CONCLUSION
On balance, the implications of the majority's position
represent a healthier judicial approach to the total collec-
tive bargaining relationship than does Justice Goldberg's
stand. It is very easy to become so consumed with concern
for flexible management of the collective enterprise that
sight is lost of the legitimate interests and expectations of
the individual workers. It is easy as well to lay captive to
the idea that only through maximum enhancement of group
stability and decision can the interests of the individual
workers ever really be promoted. But the individual does
exist apart from the group, and, at least to the extent that
the provisions of the collective agreement are clear, he
should generally be able to rely upon and expect benefits
that the group has promised him. And surely the law
should not be witness, indeed accessory, to the wicked and
absurd shell game played with individual interests in the
New York line of cases and particularly in Soto. 9 ' Al-
though not inevitable, this kind of posturing is an all too
probable extension of Justice Goldberg's response in this
area. Furthermore, acceptance of the majority's policy
choice does not mean, as Justice Goldberg implies, that the
group will be overthrown with the resulting chaos, 94 nor
does it necessarily mean that the courts, rather than the
collective parties, should or will henceforth manage the
collective relationship.
So far as substantive review is concerned, the majority's
position contemplates, at most, that when the collective par-
ties themselves have formalized some basic agreement, the
individual worker may then rely somewhat upon the spe-
cific provisions of the agreement at least until they are
changed in a new contract or by formal amendment. It does
not necessarily follow that legitimate collective interests in
contract administration are to be stymied by recalcitrant
individuals, nor does it follow that the individual can insist
in court upon his interpretation of contract provisions to
the same extent that the union could insist upon its inter-
193 See notes 131-41 supra with accompanying text.
'" As one commentator had sensibly put it: "Chaos is likely to result
whatever rule is adopted." Report of the Committee on State Labor Legis-
lation, Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining, ABA Section of Labor
Relations Law 164, 168 (1963).
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pretation in negotiations with the employer. 9 5 The Court's
decision on the merits in Humphrey attempts to make it
clear, in fact, that only in the unusual case should the
collective parties be held, on judicial review of the merits
of a grievance or arbitral determination, to have trans-
gressed the bounds of permissibility.
In circumstances involving contract ambiguities, or mat-
ters not expressly covered by the existing agreement, or
perhaps even matters that, while apparently covered by the
provisions, were not really anticipated or contemplated
when the contract was negotiated, it would appear that the
anticipated scope of judicial review on the merits is to be
essentially the same as it is during the contract drafting
stage - if the collective parties have provided procedurally
for mutual resolution of ambiguities and the like through
the grievance procedure. At the contract formation stage
of collective bargaining the individual basically is pro-
tected only if he can demonstrate that an agreement
breaches the union's duty of fair representation in that it
is perverse in its effect upon him or is invidiously dis-
criminatory.'96 This limitation of substantive external re-
view, even at the contract administration stages of collec-
tive bargaining, is necessary to promote needed flexibility
on the part of the union in balancing competing interests
for
"the collective agreement by which the individual and
the collective parties are governed is not limited to
the four corners of the written instrument. It is the
whole agreement, including industrial customs, estab-
lished practices, understandings and precedents which
infuse the contractual words with life and meaning.
The collective agreement inevitably includes incom-
plete terms and unresolved ambiguities; and the indi-
vidual's rights, like those of the collective parties, are
subject to these gaps and uncertainties."'97
But, despite the fact that the contemplated scope of
judicial review is probably rather limited, Justice Gold-
berg's fears are valid to the extent that there remains the
danger that reviewing courts will nevertheless be too strin-
gent in protecting individual interests by finding clarity
when the contract provision is not really clear. By the
same token, they may be too lax by finding ambiguity where
115 Cf. Summers, supra note 158, at 396.
"91 See note 41 supra with accompanying text; infra notes 198-201 with
text.
197 Summers, supra note 158, at 396.
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none really exists. Many potential defects, in fact, attend
any system of judicial review that is expected to perform
the task of reconciling individual and collective needs in
the administration of collective agreements.
JUDICIAL REvIEw OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS AND ACTIONS:
THE QUEST FOR MANAGEABLE STANDARDS AND OTHER
LIMITATIONS OF LITIGATION
Any tribunal that is external to the collective bargain-
ing machinery will find it difficult to ascertain and apply
appropriate standards in reviewing the collective parties'
actions in administering the collective bargaining agree-
ment. In the first place, standards that are not derived
from the collective agreement or relationship have not
proved to be particularly satisfactory. For example, stand-
ards applied in enforcing the duty of fair representation
have usually been cumbersome analogies to such constitu-
tional concepts as are found in the Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 8  Unions have thus been admonished to
avoid arbitrariness, capriciousness, "hostile discrimination,"
"invidious" discrimination, or "discrimination not based on
... relevant differences." 99 And the Supreme Court's latest
pronouncement on the subject is that this means that a
union does not breach its "duty of fair representation in
taking a good faith position contrary to that of some indi-
viduals whom it represents nor in supporting the position
of one group of employees against that of another."2 0 Ex-
cluding for the moment the possibility of defining invidious
discrimination, etc., by reference to the provisions of the
collective agreement, this means that the courts are in a
position only to remedy such abuses of power as are par-
ticularly gross, for the Supreme Court has further advised
that, "[I]nevitably differences arise in the manner and de-
gree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect
individual employees and classes of employees. The mere
existence of such differences does not make them invalid.
"I' On the difficulty of finding appropriate standards, see Cox, The Duty
of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 166-69 (1957); Wellington,
Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a
Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1339-43 (1958) ; Note, 65 Hnav. L. REV.
490 (1952) ; Note, 62 YALE L.J. 282 (1953).
... Steel v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
200 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964) ; see Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953); 'Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F. 2d 569
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950) ; Wallace Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 323
U.S. 248, 255 (1944).
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The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is
hardly to be expected.""2 1
The Court's wholly realistic approach also obviates any
possibility of universal resort to full blown fiduciary con-
cepts. This is fortunate, for the application of such concepts
in the collective bargaining realm is pregnant with the
danger of the inappropriately automatic, void as a matter
of law, kind of reasoning employed by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in the Clark02 case and by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in the Humphrey case.203 A root notion of fidu-
ciary obligation is, after all, that the fiduciary will not be
continuously subject to conflicts of interest within the class
comprising the cestui que trust. In the union representation
context, particularly in seniority disputes, however, con-
flict of interest is the normal condition. Thus a crucial con-
dition precedent to the application of fiduciary rules is
absent. The Wisconsin and Kentucky Courts, employing
orthodox fiduciary doctrine, nevertheless held that when
different groups of employees vie for seniority advantage,
a union that backs one group obviously breaches its obli-
gation to the others. But, as the Supreme Court declared in
Humphrey, such a legal result cannot be the consequence
of the normal condition in which a union is found when,
acting with the employer, it seeks to resolve a seniority
dispute.0 4
Although automatic reasoning, from orthodox fiduciary
premises, has thus been rejected, this does not mean that
no service may be derived from the transplantation of some
concepts of fiduciary law to the realm of collective bar-
gaining. Such concepts might, in fact, provide some useful
standards when review is sought of settlements rendered in
disciplinary grievances. In such grievances there rarely
are direct and legitimate secondary group interests and thus
no direct conflict of interest within the cestui que trust.0 5
21 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra note 200, at 338. In Steele, supra
note 199, the Court further stated that the union's obligation "does not
mean that the statutory representative of a craft is barred from making
contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some of the members of
,the craft represented. Variations in the terms of the contract based on
differences relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract in condi-
tions to which they are to be applied, such as differences in seniority, the
type of work performed, the competence and skill with which it is per-
formed, are within the scope of the bargaining representatibn of a craft, all
of whose members are not identical in their interest or merit." 323 U.S.
at 203.
202 See notes 153-58 supra with accompanying text.
203 See notes 159 and 169 supra with accompanying text.
204 As to conflicts of interests within seniority disputes, see notes W-5-68
8supra and accompanying text.
205 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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But there might, on the other hand, be some indirect con-
flict of interest. A court, for example, might be hard put to
review, according to orthodox fiduciary standards, a situa-
tion in which a union has found it auspicious to trade-off
unrelated grievances, relinquishing some that have prob-
able merit in order to secure a gain on the entire package.
Despite the difficulties involved, it can be expected that
over the next few years more consideration will be given
to the formulation of a law of fiduciary obligations in col-
lective bargaining, for it is now very likely that union
officials are required by statute to act, in collective bar-
gaining, pursuant to a personal fiduciary obligation. Sec-
tion 501 of the LMRDA imposes a fiduciary obligation,
"taking into account the special problems and functions of
a labor organization", on union officials and permits mem-
bers of the union to sue for breach on behalf of the union. °6
The cause of action is thus like a stockholder's derivative
action.20 7 And, according to Professor Cox, "The principles
stated in section 501 (a) were drawn from the Restatement
of Agency in an effort to incorporate the whole body of
common law precedents defining the fiduciary obligations
of agents and trustees with such adaptions as might be re-
quired to take into account 'the special problems and func-
tions of a labor organization . . ."208
While the main thrust of the provision is obviously to
assure against financial misfeasance on the part of union
officials, it is clear that it encompasses more than this.
206 § 501, 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501 (Supp. IV, 1963). For a
more extensive treatment of this subject, see Rosen, supra note 160, at
427-32.
207 Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 297-99 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 325 F.
2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963) ; see Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under
the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 819, 828 (1960) ; Dugan,
Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48 Guo. L.J. 277, 279 (1959) ;
Wollett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF.
LAB. 267, 270 (1960) ; of. Note, 51 YALE L.J. 331, 333 (1941).
20 Cox, supra note 207, at 828. (As to the now Solicitor General Cox's
unique competence in construing the Act, see Nelson v. Johnson, supra note
207, 212 F. Supp. at 300 n. 69). See also, Ostrin, Fiduciary Obligations of
Union Offlcers: A Critical Analysis of Section 501, in SyMPosIum ON THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSuRE AcT OF 1959 (1961 Slovenkl
ed.) 528, 534-37; Tarbuitton, The Fiduciary Responsibility of Offlcers of
Labor Organization Under the Common Law and LMRDA, id. at 513;
Dugan, supra note 207, at 297-301; Katz, Fiduciary Obligations of Union
Offlcers Under Section 501 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959, 14 LAB. L.J. 542, 546-48 (1963) ; Note, The Fiduciary
Duty of Union Oflicers Under the LMRDA: A Guide to the Interpretation
of Section 501, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 486, 502-05 (1962).
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Legislative history,20 9 judicial opinion 210 and scholarly com-
mentary 211 indicate that the fiduciary duty under section
501 is to extend to the sphere of collective bargaining. The
scope of the duty is to be ascertained by reference to com-
mon law doctrine, but the common law is unclear 212 and
there is growing support for the view that section 501 is a
mandate to the courts "to fashion a new federal labor law
in much the same way that the federal courts have fash-
ioned a new substantive law of collective bargaining con-
tracts under section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act." 213 To
the extent that this new federal labor law is responsive to
the realities of collective bargaining situations where the
union officials are daily compelled to make judgments as to
conflicting interests within the cestui que trust class, the
standards of fiduciary conduct demanded by section 501 are
not likely to be greatly improved over those developed to
date under the duty of fair representation. 1 4
209 There is substantial support in the legislative history of the Elliott
bill, which contained exactly the same fiduciary provision as the LMRDA,
for this interpretation. See H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82
(1959) (Supplemental views); Statement of Representative Elliott, read
by Representative Bolling, 105 CONG. REC. 14212-14213 (1959).
See also LMRDA § 2(a), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (Supp.
IV, 1963).
210 See Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 240. 284-96 (D. Minn.), aff'd,
325 F. 2d 646, 651 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Parks v. IBEW, 203 F. Supp. 288, 295,
308-10 (D. Md. 1962), reversed on other grounds, 314 F. 2d 886 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963); Moschetta v. Cross, 48 L.R.R.M. 2669
(D. D.C. 1961).
211 See MeRee, The Adversely Affected Employee and the Grievance and
Arbitration Process, in SYMPosIum oN LABoR REIATIos LAW 431, 444
(Slovenko ed. 1961) ; Wollett, supra note 207, at 285-86; Report on the
Committee on Labor Arbitration, Individual Rights in Grievance Arbitra-
tion Procedure, 56 L.R.R.M. 418, 420 ns. 14-15 (1964), and accompanying
text; Development in the Law, Judicial Control of Actions of Private
Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983, 1003 n. 51 (1963).
212 See materials cited note 208 supra. Comment on the sparse and
confused state of the law regarding fiduciary duties in the field of labor
relations, and the limitations of resort to analogy, has been made by
Wollett, supra note 207, at 276-77; Note, Counsel Fees for Union Offleers
Under the Fiduciary Provision of Landrum-Griffln, 73 YALE L.J. 443, 449-52
(1964).
21' Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp.
608, 617 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 284 F. 2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 833 (1961) ; accord, Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 241-42 (D.
Minn.), aff'd, 325 F. 2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
2"I It is possible, as well, that to the extent the § 501 duty might overlap
with the employee's fair representation or contract breach remedies, the
§ 501 action would be pre-empted. See LMRDA § 603, 73 Stat. 540, 29 U.S.C.
§ 523 (Supp. IV, 1963) ; Wollett, supra note 207, at 286; cf. Highway Truck
Drivers and Helpers Local 107 v. Cohen, supra note 213, at 612-14; Note,
supra note 212, 73 YALE L.J. 443, 449 (1964).
An additional avenue of relief from abusive use of the grievance ma-
chinery by the union may be available to individuals under Title I of the
LMRDA. § 101(a) (5), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (Supp.
IV, 1963) provides:
"No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by
such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has
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Even when the courts turn from exclusive resort to
standards external to the collective relationship and seek
to apply those embodied in the collective agreement, the
result is not very satisfactory. Of course the collective
agreement is useful to a court to the extent that the collec-
tive parties have established by it "standard(s) which both
sides have agreed . . . [are to be] norm(s) in relation to
which a dispute it to be settled." 1 ' By looking into the
agreement it becomes possible for a reviewing court tojudge collective actions in administering it not only by
vague or inappropriate external standards of fairness or
fiduciary behavior, but also according to the contract terms
or according to what the individual's reasonable expecta-
tions are under those terms. But, as earlier discussed, no
collective agreement will present a reviewing tribunal with
an elaborate catalogue of complete and unambiguous stand-
ards.216 While some provisions may contain explicit rules
to govern aspects of the continuing tripartite relationship,
in large measure the agreement is composed of broad, am-
biguous and incomplete standards that must undergo in-
tensive future interpretation. Any agency that reviews
collective actions and determinations must resort to "the
industrial common law - the practices of the industry and
the shop-" 21 7 to fill in the spare bones of the formal con-
tract and infuse the contractual words with life and mean-
ing. It is unlikely that the courts would be equal to that
task. As the Supreme Court has recognized, even the
ablest judges cannot be expected to bring the necessary
been (A) served with written specific charges; (iB) given a reasonable
time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing."
See also § 609, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 529 (Supp. IV, 1963).
In the present context, the question raised by the section is: "When a
union agrees with management that an employee should be disciplined,
does this constitute union 'discipline' within the purview of section
101(a) (5) ?" Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism:
Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship,
61 MicI. L. REv. 1435, 1501-02 (1963).
Upon review of the few cases thus far decided, Blumrosen concluded:
"If the union takes an affirmative hand in securing the discipline,
the action is subject to the procedural provisions of section 101(a) (5).
'But if the union action is passive acquiescence, it becomes 'discipline'
subject to 101(a) (5) only if the union was under a duty to process the
grievance. This reading of section 101(a) (5) adds little to existing
law concerning the union's duty to process a grievance. Such a duty
must be found, and violated, before section 101 (a) (5) comes into play."
Id. at 1503; see also Rosenberg, Interpretative Problems of Title I of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 16 IND. & LAB. RErL. Rv.
405, 424-26 (1963).
215 Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective
Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 733 (1950).
210 See notes 31-34 and 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
217 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-S2
(1960). Quoted in full, supra n1ote 118 with text.
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expertise in "industrial law" "to bear upon the determina-
tion of a grievance."21
The difficulty in ascertaining judicially manageable
standards makes real the possibility that aggrieved indi-
viduals, seeking "some neutral tribunal where, along with
union and management, . . . [they would] have an oppor-
tunity to be [meaningfully] heard," '219 will find the courts
to be essentially rubber stamps or legitimizing agencies for
repressive collective actions.22 ° In this regard, related to
the problem of standards is the problem of proof. With
expanded judicial review, it would still be exceedingly
difficult for a grievant to prove factually, to a court's satis-
faction, that the collective parties have acted unfairly, in
abuse of discretion, or upon an error of fact. This is especi-
ally true of disciplinary cases but would also be true of any
case in which the grievant alleged bias, bad faith, vindic-
tiveness, or bureaucratic inefficiency or bungling. First,
legal rules of evidence would present a bar to effective
review. Particularly where arbitration is involved, the
reviewing court will usually be presented with little docu-
mentation of probative value other than the arbitrator's
opinion for there normally is no transcript or report.221
And, as to challenges to grievance determinations in gen-
eral, whether rendered in arbitration or not, the caliber of
proof that is usually to be expected will make application
of the available standards of little use in attempting to
"reach the subtle forms of discrimination, insensitivity and
other covert abuses in [all phases of] grievance handling. "222
Unless unfairness is to be inferred from the circum-
stances, judicial review even in extreme cases like Soto,223
may not help the aggrieved individual, for the complaining
individual generally must meet the burden of demonstrat-
ing, by positive evidence, that the union or the collective
parties were improperly activated politically or were other-
wise acting in bad faith or engaging in invidious discrimina-
tion. Especially if the collective agreement is unclear, the
collective parties will likely have to show merely some
proper reason for acting or some "reasonable" criterion for
218 Id. at 582.
Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitra-
tion, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 370 (1962).
220 See, e.g., Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F. 2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
Discussed note 56 supra.
22 See ELKO R & ELKOURI, How ABBITRA'oN WoRKs 152-55 (1960);
Aaron, Arbitration and Its Critics, 10 LAB. L.J. 605-10 (continued on 645)
(1959).
222 Summers, supra note 219, at 410 n. 188.
223 See notes 135-139 supra and accompanying text.
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the classification that was drawn.224 And, it is seldom diffi-
cult for unions and employers, or the courts, to find some
apparently legitimate reason to justify almost any classifi-
cation or action.225 Therefore, unless the classification or
action is obviously based on some palpably unlawful
criteria, such as race, or absent a valid union shop agree-
ment, non-membership in the union,226 the courts will
rarely be in a position to conclude that the collective action
was invalid. Once apparently legitimate reasons for the
collective action have been presented, the individual will
then have to demonstrate that those reasons were pretext-
uous. Rarely will the collective parties act in such a man-
ner as to make available to the aggrieved individual evi-
dence that its presumable valid reasons were mere pre-
text.22
7
Another disadvantage to litigation relates to the factor
of time, for it will ordinarily be years before an individual's
claim is adjudicated 228 and then, of course, before a strange
tribunal that, in all likelihood, is largely unfamiliar with
the on-going and particular context in which the dispute
arose. Litigation could thus be so time consuming as to
dissipate real enjoyment of the fruits of any ultimate vic-
tory. Furthermore, to gain relief an expensive law suit
must be conducted - this is usually out of the question for
224 See, e.g., Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 177 F. Supp. 421, 430
(E.D. :Pa. 1959) (dictum), aff'd, 275 F. 2d 342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 811 (1960) ; Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. at 158 (1955).
225 See, e.g., Ford Motor 0o. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (dis-
crimination in favor of military veterans upheld); Britt v. Trailmobile
Co., supra note 200 (same) ; Whitfield v. United Steelworkers, Local 2708.
263 F. 2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959) (apparent racial
discrimination justified) ; cf. Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84
N.W. 2d 523 (1957) (disparity of treatment based upon sex affirmed) ; see
also Wellington, supra note 198, at 1342 n. 77.
221 See Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F. 2d 191,
198-99 (4th Cir. 1963); Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 58 A. 2d 729
(1948).
227 But see Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, supra note
226. The court was impressed by the fact that a union official explicitly
wrote that "there was nothing I could do until you became a full fledged
member .... " 316 F. 2d at 195. The Court was further impressed by the
fact that the union had explained why its "reasons" for not acting on plain-
tiff's behalf had not stopped it from acting on behalf of other, similarly
situated, employees. 316 F. 2d at 195-96.
See also Guzzo v. United Steelworkers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2379, 2386 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1960), cert. denied sub nom., Smith v. Superior Court, 365 U.S.
802 (1961) (the court speaks of shifting the burden of proof).
22S In Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F. 2d 191,
192 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1963), the court stated:
"We ndte the unhappy fact that this litigation was begun more than
four years ago, a circumstance for which the District Judge who tried
the case was in no way responsible ......
See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 214, at 1514 n. 216 (chart of time lapse
in representative court cases).
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all but especially outraged workers. In addition, it is to be
expected that at least some courts, if only to avoid the
odious tasks of presiding over strange family squabbles,
will continue to compound the general limitations attend-
ent to judicial remedy by "creating numerous procedural
and technical barriers which tend to restrict effective pro-
tection of employees. "229
THE NLRB: ANOTHER PUBLIc FoRM?
Recent developments indicate that any future extensive
and substantive external review of collective actions in
contract administration is likely to be undertaken not only
by the courts but concurrently by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board - an administrative agency possessed of elabo-
rate labor relations expertise. Beginning with the Miranda
case,21 the Board has of late concluded that when a union, in
the course of processing a grievance, breaches its duty of fair
representation, arising under section 9 (a) of the NLRA,231
a violation of section 7 of the Act 23 2 results and that viola-
2""Blumrosen, supra note 214, at 1471. Professor Blumrosen commented
further that courts "have insisted on technicalities of pleading [n. 93, e.g.,
Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F. 2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962) ; Wilson v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 368 Mich. 61, 117
N.W. 2d 184 (1962) ; Carlini v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 71 N.J. Super. 101,
176 A. 2d 266 (App. Div. 1961), cert. denied, 37 N.J. 133, 179 A. 2d 569
(1962)], have applied doctrines restricting the suability of unions, have
imposed an exhaustion of contract remedies requirement where such
remedies seem unavailable [n. 95 see Widuk v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 17 Wis.
2d 367, 369, 117 N.W. 2d 245, 247 (1962) ; Larsen v. American Airlines, Inc.,
207 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 313 P. 2d 599 (2d Cir. 19063)], and
have hesitated to allow the employee to protect his interest in arbitration
[n. 96 In re Soto, 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 165 N.E. 2d 855, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 282
(1960)]." But see Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316
F. 2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963) (where counsel did such a poor job that at one
point the court commented bitterly that "the thing has been poorly
handled .. " supra at 197 n. 8. Nevertheless, reading the pleadings very
liberally, the court held that a proper cause of action had been stated and
remanded the case for trial on the merits.) See also Ferro v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 296 F. 2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Nobile v. Woodward,
200 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ; Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 55
L.R.R.M. 2552 (W.D. -Pa. 1964) ; Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 58 A.
2d 729 (1948); Rumbaugh v. Winifred R.R., 55 L.R.R.M. 2602 (4th Cir.
194).
It is noteworthy that preclusion of punitive damages may be another
limitation imposed ,by the courts on the duty of fair representation. See
Brady v. TWA, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1961); Thlompson v.
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, supra at 203 n. 21.
230 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (divided three to two)
enforcement denied, 326 F. 2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (divided two to one).
23 Quoted note 92 supra.
31249 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 01 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1958) :
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
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tion is remediable by the Board."' Remedy is to be found
pursuant to unfair labor practice proceedings against the
union under section 8 (b) (1) (A)234 and against an employer
that accedes to the breach under section 8(a) (1) .2.3 The
Board was further of the opinion that "a statutory bar-
gaining representative and an employer also respectively
violate Sections 8(b) (2) 236 and 8 (a) (3 )237 when, for arbi-
trary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of unfair clas-
sification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an
employer to derogate the employment status of an em-
ployee. ' 238 Although a much divided panel of the Second
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3)."
213 Miranda was a seniority case involving a truck driver, Lopuch, who
was eleventh on a seniority list of twenty-one. His employer's business was
seasonable and the applicable collective bargaining agreement, between the
company and the union of which he was a member, provided that drivers
could ask for leave of absences from April 15 to October 15 without loss
of seniority. Lopuch, however, obtained permission to leave on Friday,
April 12, 1957, at the close of business, rather than on Monday, April 15.
The employer did not believe that his seniority rights would be prejudiced.
Lopuch returned late, because of an illness excused by the company. The
union, however, on the prompting of other members, demanded that his
seniority be reduced. When the union discovered that he had returned
late because of an excused illness it abandoned that ground and insisted
that he be reduced in seniority because he had left prior to April 15. The
company acquiesced in the union's demand. Nothing in the record indi-
cated that the union was biased against Lopuch or was otherwise dis-
criminating against him. In this posture the case went to the Board.
2361 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958) :
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents - - -
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7.
235 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958)
"(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - - -
"(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce emplo)yees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
216 (FootnOte added). 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1958),
provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
"to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to dis-
criminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uni-
formly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
217 (Footnote added). 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140
(1947), as amended, § 201(e), 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(Supp. IV, 1963), provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization . . . [except as to specified classes bf
union shop agreements]."
140 N.L.R.B. at 1&6.
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Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order in Miranda,23 9
the Board has continued to apply its theories in new cases
240
but it has not sought certiorari in Miranda.241
If the NLRB's new doctrines are ultimately affirmed and
the Board becomes available as another forum in which
individuals may challenge abusive collective actions in con-
tract administration,4 many of the limitations on external
review, from the point of view of the individual, would be
eliminated.
"The concomitants of administration - the power to
investigate, to urge informal settlement and to provide
an expeditious hearing, and the expertise of the per-
sonnel involved - all suggest that the NLRB is
equipped to handle these problems more speedily and
more fairly than are the courts. This is true even in
light of the great difficulties which the Board has faced
in keeping its dockets anywhere near current. With all
of its overload and backlog, it provides a more effective
forum for solution of these problems than the courts."
243
23 N.L.R.B. v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F. 2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
The limited holding is that the Court refused to enforce the Board's
order on the ground that "discrimination for reasons wholly unrelated to
'union membership, loyalty, the acknowledgement of union authority, or
the performance of union obligations,' is not sufficient to support findings
of violations of Sections 8(a)(3), 8(a)(1), 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act." 326 F. 2d at 175.
But only Judge Medina in the principal opinion, rejected the section
7-8(b) (1) (A), 8(a) (1) theory as well as the section 8(b) (2)-8(a) (3)
theory.
Judge Lumbard, concurring, expressly declined to consider the section
7 theory because of the insufficiency of evidence for the Bloard "to support
its conclusion that the union took 'hostile action, for irrelevant, unfair
or invidious reasons' against Lopuch." 326 F. 2d at 180.
Judge Friendly, dissenting, only examined the section 8(b) (2)-8(a) (3)
theory. 326 F. 2d at 180.
240 Recently the Board decided that a union's failure, for racial reasons,
to process the grievances of Negro employees violate its statutory duty
of fair representation and as such, violated sections 8(b) (1) (A), 8(b) (2),
and 8(b) (3). Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289
(1964).
Section 8(b)(3), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1958),
provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
"to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is
the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section
9(a)."
As to other proceedings in which the Board has applied its theories of
fair representation, see Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration,
supra note 211, at 421 n.22.
241 The Board was likely looking for a more favorable case which
might be supplied by Hughes Tool Co., supra note 240, or it may be
awaiting a division in the circuits.
242 It can be expected that the jurisdiction of the courts would not be
generally pre-empted. See note 171 supra.
248 Blumrosen, supra note 214, at 1514. It is important to note as well
that the prosecuting of unfair labor practice complaints to vindicate a
duty of fair representation would be borne by the Board's General Counsel.
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Unquestionably the Board has technical advantages over
the courts in this area. Furthermore, the Board and its
staff could bring to grievance disputes general and detailed
labor relations expertise and extensive experience in inter-
preting collective agreements in unfair labor disputes be-
tween individuals and collective parties. But even if sub-
stantive review by the Labor Board is more useful for the
individual grievant it nonetheless is subject to one final
objection that is shared by the courts: There is a danger
that the courts or the Board by exercising frequent and in-
tensive substantive supervision over the merits of collective
bargaining decisions will thereby substitute public for
private ordering and industrial self-government. At its
extreme the danger is that collective determinations would
too often be overturned. But even if this were not the re-
sult, as it probably would not be, the consequence for col-
lective bargaining as industrial self-government would still
be deleterious. It matters not that the collective parties
may almost invariably be vindicated if they must carefully
justify their actions in court or before an administrative
agency. The necessity of having collective decisions ratified
by a public agency in this manner is itself a significant
burden as well as a continual demonstration of close and
substantial public control. If no satisfactory alternatives
were available to assure a proper regard for the interests of
individual workers, this judicial-administrative role might
be accepted without further comment as it is so far as
statutorily defined unfair labor practices are concerned.
But there is an alternative approach that, without com-
pletely negating the expansion of external review of the
merits, could minimize the necessity for its invocation. The
alternative is to enhance participation by the aggrieved
individual in the private administrative processes of collec-
tive bargaining - particularly in arbitration.
INDIVIDUALS IN ARBITRATION - [WHY] CLOSE THE DooRs
[IF] THEY'RE COMING IN THE WINDOWS?
So far as workers subject to the NLRA and the LMRA
are concerned, the issues bearing upon individual partici-
pation in arbitral proceedings have not yet been squarely
faced by the Supreme Court or by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.244 It is possible, however, that the inference
214 The General Counsel of the NLRB has consistently refused even
to process charges that an unfair labor practice results when an indi-
vidual grievance is settled in the employee's absence. The General
Counsel has adopted the position that the proviso of § 9(a) of the
NLRA, quoted at note 92 supra, was intended only to protect employers
from unfair labor practice charges if they were to entertain grievances
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capable of being drawn from the Humphrey decision, that
aggrieved individuals may have a right to participate at
least under some circumstances,245 will become actual hold-
ing in the not too distant future. Such rulings are especially
likely if it is true, as it appears from the opinions in
Humphrey, and from those of the NLRB, that the basic
policy question, what rights should an individual have
under a collective agreement, has been resolved in such a
manner as to assure the availability, when necessary, of the
courts or the Labor Board for the fair adjudication of indi-
viduals' claims under collective agreements. If this is a spe-
cific teaching of Humphrey, its importance is great; but
also of significance is what Humphrey teaches as the latest
in a chain of Supreme Court decisions stretching back to
the Westinghouse case. ' This lesson, perhaps broader than
the first, is that the Court is seeking under section 301 to
formulate a uniform and consistent, both logically and
experientially, federal substantive law of collective bar-
gaining relations. Thus, after Lincoln Mills2 47 was decided,
the Westinghouse doctrine, that suits for uniquely personal
rights and suits by individuals for breach of collective
agreements were not justiciable under section 301, was
progressively undermined until it was finally repudiated
in Smith2'" and Humphrey. This was done in part to assure
that collective agreements are consistently interpreted ac-
cording to federal law, not according to such law merely
in suits brought by employers and unions and according to
state law in suits brought by individuals.249
Under the uniform federal law thus far created, the
primacy of contractual arbitration, as the collective parties'
voluntary self-governing substitute for litigation and eco-
nomic contest, has been established.25 ° To promote arbi-
tration, the Court has ascribed far reaching ramifications
to the existence of a general grievance arbitration clause
in a collective agreement. Even if there is no explicit no-
strike clause in the agreement, one will be inferred. 5' More-
outside of union auspices, but imposed no obligation on employers to
deal with individuals. Admin. Rulings of NLRB Gen. Counsel. Case
No. SR-2721, 63-2 CCH NLRB 12,745 (1963) ; Case No. 317, 30 L.R.R.M.
1103 (1952); Case No. 418, 31 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1952).
215 See notes 183-87 supra and accompanying text.240Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). See notes 77-89 supra and accompanying
text.
" Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"4s Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
2' See notes 81-2 supra and accompanying text.
25o For the earlier discussion of arbitration of which this paragraph
is a partial reiteration, see notes 107-120 supra and accompanying text.
251 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
1964]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
over, although the collective parties may provide that a
disposition of a grievance or a dispute, other than by arbi-
tration, is final,252 in suits to compel arbitration or to review
arbitration awards, the function of the courts is narrowly
limited to determining
"whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate
the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power
to make the award he made. An order to arbitrate the
particular grievance should not be denied unless it may
be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage. '253
Neither before arbitration is ordered nor upon review of
an arbitration award are the courts in any way to review
the merits of a grievance. 2, 4 A similar policy that favors
effective arbitration over resort to the Board has evolved
in the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. 5
Integration of the various policies thus far adduced from
the Supreme Court's decisions portends a rule of law that
recognizes a right, at least under some circumstances, in
interested individuals to participate personally once the
collective parties have undertaken to subject a grievance
to arbitration. It would appear, in fact, that interested
individuals must be permitted to participate in some cir-
cumstances if all of these policies are to be soundly recon-
ciled.
To all intents and purposes, under the arbitration line
of cases, the arbitrator's decision and award - if he has
jurisdiction - is to be final and not subject to re-opening onjudicial (or administrative) review. Under Humphrey and
Miranda,25 6 on the other hand, the aggrieved individual
appears entitled to have his claim, for breach of the collec-
tive agreement and/or of the duty of fair representation,
meaningfully adjudicated somewhere. It is not likely that
an individual will receive such an adjudication in an arbi-
tration proceeding if he is a member of an interested class
to a seniority dispute that is opposed in the arbitration by
his representative, the union. By the same token, the adju-
252 See General Drivers, Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963)
see also note 128 supra.
258 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960).
254 See cases cited note 120 supra.
2155 See Spielberg Mfg. Go., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), discussed note
120 supra.
216 See notes 230-41 supra and accompanying text.
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dication of an individual's claim before an arbitrator will
be suspect in a disciplinary case, such as Soto,25 ' where the
individual alleges that his representation by the union was
mere sham. If the individual is to have his day in court
in cases such as these, and if the merits of the arbitration
award are not to be re-opened on judicial or administrative
review, the individual must be given the opportunity to
participate in the arbitration proceedings.
In terms of legal consequence, permitting individuals to
participate once arbitration is invoked would, of course,
serve the orderly and uniform development of substantive
federal law by promoting the twin policies of res judicata
and singleness of suit and further by eliminating extensive
forum shopping. So far as the collective parties are con-
cerned, if the law is going to permit the individual a com-
plete airing of his claim, it is in their interest that this be
done in arbitration. Consistency of results and the uniform
development of the common law of the shop would thus be
promoted and the collective parties would generally avoid
the possibility that an external agency might make even
a more careful search into their activities than would an
arbitrator. Furthermore, there are psychological and other
social advantages to be derived from keeping substantive
adjudication essentially within the system of private in-
dustrial government and from maintaining effective con-
trol over the character of the adjudicative forum. Individ-
ual workers might also reap benefits from institutionalized
participation in arbitration: their claims would be more
rapidly adjudicated and they would avoid the expense of
law suits, although they might sometimes have to bear the
additional expenses of arbitration. Assuming the arbitra-
tor can be kept from being unduly biased in favor of the
union or both collective parties, individual workers could
expect more knowledgeable, and concomitantly more con-
sistently just or equitable, adjudications of their claims.
Although the Court may adopt a rule of law favoring
individual participation, it cannot be overlooked that there
is perhaps another way, not to the advantage of aggrieved
individuals, of reconciling the doctrines arising from its
section 301 decisions. The Court could possibly decide that
if an individual's claim is adjudicated in an arbitration in-
voked by the collective parties, he has received all the "day
in court" to which he is entitled, even if he is not himself
permitted to participate 58 Such a rule might be preferred
""In re Soto, 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 165 N.E. 2d 855, 198 N.Y. S. 2d 282 (1960).
See notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
... Cf. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), dis-
cussed in, Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilemma: The Carey
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by the collective parties but it would hardly square with
concepts of fundamental fairness or due process of law.259
The Anglo-American legal tradition of procedural fair play,
in fact, may be said to render it inappropriate for courts to
ratify arbitral decisions that result from proceedings in
which some interested parties have no opportunity for fair
presentation of their positions. Furthermore, it could be
argued that judicial ratification of arbitration decisions that
result from proceedings in which interested parties are not
permitted to participate is subject to constitutional objec-
tion, on the ground that the action of the government,
through its courts, denies interested individuals their prop-
erty without procedural due process of law.260 Because of
Decision and Trilateral Arbitration of Jurisdictional Disputes, 11 U.C.L.A.
L. Ruv. 327 (1964).
It may be assumed that if the Court were to adopt such a doctrine,
the individual would still be able to successfully challenge an arbitration
award in a suit for breach of the duty of fair representation if he could
affirmatively prove active fraud or caprice, on the part of the collective
parties, or incapacitating bias, on the part of the arbitrator.
250 There is an increasing tendency to discuss the problems of individual
participation in terms of due process of law, constitutional or otherwise.
See, e.g., Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in
Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1961) ; Wirtz, Due Process of
Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES, Eleventh Annual Meeting
of the National Academy of Arbitrators (McKelvey ed. 1958) 1.
260 Initially it might be argued that judicial enforcement of particular
awards rendered in such proceedings is prohibited. See Barrows v. Jackson,
:346 U.S. 249 (1953); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 298, 300-04
(1956) (dissenting opinion) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Sim-
kins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959, 968 (4th Cir. 1963).
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). But a broader argument might also
be made based upon the power of the courts under § 301 'of the LIRA
to create a substantive federal law of collective bargaining relations.
In the light of this power, the court's function is more than merely to
enforce private agreements; it is to create law, presumably in accord
with the Constitution. Thus, if the Supreme Court, in creating sub-
stantive federal law, were to hold that there is no individual right to
participate in arbitration and no other forum to which an individual
could look for a full adjudication of his contract interest, it could be
argued that the Court had established a rule in violatibn of the Constitu-
tion. The premise of such an argument, however, would be that indi-
viduals have personal legal rights under the collective agreement. So
far the Court appears of the opinion that they do have such rights.
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). Another variant of a consti-
tutional argument would be based upon the fact that arbitration is,
under the Supreme Court's decisions, the accepted substitute for litigation
in contract disputes. If this is so, arbitration performs a state or govern-
mental function and consequently is subject to constitutional require-
ments. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Public Utilities
Commission v. 'Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Simpkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, supra.
Constitutional arguments have been made in cases involving the lack
of individual participation. In New York, a constitutional argument
was rejected. Chupka v. Lorenz-Schneider Co., 12 N.Y. 2d 1, 186 N.E.
2d 191, 233 N.Y.S. 2d 929 (1962), appeal dismissed for lack of a sub-
stantial federal question, 372 U.S. 227 (1963) (discussed note 139 supra).
In Wisconsin, the court avoided the constitutional issue. Clark v. Hein-
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the possibility, nonetheless, of such an exclusionary rule,
or the possibility that the Supreme Court might recant on
the presumed promise of Humphrey, that the individual is
entitled somewhere to a fair adjudication of his claim, it is
necessary that consideration be given to certain objections
that are raised against legally compelled introduction of
individuals into arbitration.
Generally union, management 2 1 and the arbitrators,
26 2
who in a sense are the servants of the collective parties,263
have opposed compulsory participation of desirous indi-
viduals in the arbitral process, despite the fact that in
practice interested individuals are usually permitted at
least to be present.2 64 Moreover, full blown personal par-
ticipation with the blessings of the collective parties or the
arbitrator is by no means unknown, 26 5 and it has also been
reported, upon a survey of arbitrators, that when the issue
of individual participation is raised before them they gen-
erally work something out that is agreeable to everybody
but permits individual intervention and participation.266
In addition, a growing number of arbitrators and commen-
tators, generally not wholly out of fear of an imminent legal
requirement, have counselled the self-structuring of arbi-
tration to take account of due process notions that promote
participation by interested individuals.21
Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W. 2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied,
8 Wis. 2d 277, 100 N.W. 2d 317, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960) (dis-
cussed and quoted note 156 supra and accompanying text.)
"I Generally management is pro-union in this respect, both parties
desiring only collective control. See Summers, Individual Rights in Col-
lective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BuFFALo L. REv. 239, 243
(1900) ; Report, supra, note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 165-66 (1955).
262 See Fleming, supra note 258, at 238; 13 STAN. L. Rnv. 161, 165 n. 26
(1960).
"'See Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-
Management Authority Employee Autonomy, 13 RuTGRas L. REV. 631,
661-62 (1959) ; Summers, supra note 261, at 250; Report, supra note 10, 50
Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 179 (1955) ; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 946, 954 n. 53 (1957) ;
but see Wirtz, supra note 258, at 1-45 (discussion of the arbitrator's
responsibility to individuals).
264 See In re Soto, 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 165 N.E. 2d 855, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 282
(1960) (discussed in notes 135-36 supra with accompanying text) ; Fleming,
supra note 259, at 241-42; Isaacson, Labor Arbitration in State Courts,
12 Arb. J. 179, 186 (1957).
2165 See, e.g., Matter of Jennings, 44 CCH Lab. Cases 17,483 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. February 21, 1962); Harwitz v. Adams, 406 Pa. 539, 178 A. 2d
617 (1962); cf. Chrysler Oorp., 12 Lab. Arb. 738 (Board of Arbitrators-
Appeal, 1949). Cf. also cases cited note 124 supra.
261 Fleming, supra note 259, at 241. Wirtz, in fact, suggested that
"[T]here are probably ten cases of over-protection of those [individual]
interests for each one instance of under protection." Wirtz, supra note 259,
at 33.
267 See, e.g., Williams, Intervention: Rights and Policies, in LABOR Arai-
TRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE, Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the National
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A number of arguments, however, have been made
against the participation by individuals. First it is feared
that, if individuals are able to acquire favorable awards
as a result of their personal participation, dissension and
dissatisfaction with the union will result.268 It is further
feared that such internal dissension might result in the
undermining of the union's prestige and position in its con-
tinuing relations with management.269 It is thought possi-
ble, moreover, that management might actively take ad-
vantage of individual participation to undermine the union.
Although these appear to be significant considerations,
they are really superficial. It can be anticipated that union-
management common interest 270 and the unfair labor prac-
tice sanctions of the NLRA 271 will generally protect the
union from the possibility that management will take ad-
vantage of individual participation in grievance arbitration
proceedings. There is, however, some possibility that par-
ticular individual victories as a consequence of personal
participation might cause the prestige of a union to suffer.
But, particularly in disciplinary cases such as Soto272 and
Bailer,278 the union's prestige would be undermined only
because as a result of negligence, malice or bias, it was not
doing its job. It taxes emotions of sympathy to be very con-
cerned with union prestige in such circumstances. Further-
more, at least when resort is made to intervention in dis-
ciplinary cases, argument and presentation would probably
be arranged so that first the company would put on its case
Academy of Arbitrators (Kahn ed. 1968) 266; Barbash, Due Process and
Individual Rights in Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. Lab. (1964, as yet un-
published) ; Fleming, supra note 259; Wirtz, supra note 259.
268 See Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
8 LAE. L.J. 850, 855-56 (1957); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69
HARV. L. REV. 601, 626 (1956); Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L. REV.
143, 166 (1955); Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 153, 161 (1959).
269 See ibid; Note, 44 MAnQ. L. REv. 115, 119 (1960); Note, 46 VA. L.
REv. 802, 806 (1960); of. Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union'& Duty of
Fair Representation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 39, 51 (1961).
270 See 13 STAN. L. REV. 161, 165 (1960); cf. Report, supra note 10, 50
Nw. U.L. Rnv. 143, 165 (by implication).271 See § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958) (quoted in note 237
supra) ; Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance - - Whose Grievance
Is It?, 11 U. Pirr. L. REv. 35, 49 (1949) ; Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw.
U.L. REV. 143, 164 (1955) ; 13 STAN. L. REv. 161, 165 (1960).
'Problems of improper representation by minority unions could also
be handled pursuant to the NLRA. Cf. Hughes Tool Co. v. N.L.R.B., 147
F. 2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); Local 626, Teamsters, 115 N.L.R.B. 890, 892
(1956) ; Federal Telephone & Radio Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 649 (1953) ; but cf.
Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Clerks Unions, 173 F. 2d 764, 770-71 (2d
Cir. 1949).27 2 In re Soto, 7 N.Y. 2d 397, 165 N.E. 2d 855, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 282 (1960).
See notes 135-39 supra and accompanying text.2 78
ailer v. Local 470, Teamsters, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A. 2d 343 (1960).
See notes 150 supra and accompanying text.
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and then the union would put on its case and then the indi-
vidual would extend and elaborate the record. If the union
did its job properly, there would not be much that the indi-
vidual could add and consequently little cause for embar-
rassment. Finally, since arbitration will have already been
initiated, it is highly questionable that participation by
interested individuals would have significantly disruptive
and undue side effects either on the arbitral process or on
the collective bargaining relationship generally.
"Once arbitration is initiated, the employer's atten-
tion is necessarily drawn to the dispute, and thus no
opportunity remains for the union to eliminate frivo-
lous claims. Moreover, a dispute reaches arbitration
only when the parties have failed to achieve a volun-
tary settlement. Thus, the function of the arbitration
procedure should be to facilitate a satisfactory decision
by the arbitrator rather than to provide conditions con-
ducive to settlements by the parties. Recognition of the
right of individual employees to intervene will usually
be consistent with this goal. Since participation of
employees may evoke facts that might not otherwise
emerge, the arbitrator's ability to render a just and
well-considered decision is enhanced. '27 4
A major rallying point for opposition to individual par-
ticipation, nevertheless, is that such intervention will prove
dangerously disruptive to the arbitral process, impairing its
crucial function in the collective bargaining machinery.275
It is contended that, if intervention is compelled, arbitra-
tion, not itself a legal proceeding but rather an institution
that should for effectiveness be kept free of legalisms,27 6
would become encrusted with the ponderous and technical
trappings of judicial proceedings. It is feared that arbitra-
tion would thus be rendered overly formal, time consum-
274 Note, 66 YALE L.J. 946, 953 (1957); See also Sherman, supra note
271, at 49; Silver, Rights of Individual Employees in the ArbitraZ Process,
12 N.Y.U. Conf. Lab. 53, 61 (1959); Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw. U.L.
Rzv. 143, 165 (1955) ; Note, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85, 95-96 (1960);
58 MI H. L. REv. 796, 798-99 (1960) ; 13 STAN. L. REv. 161, 165-66 (1960).
275 See Isaacson, supra note 264, at 187, 190 (1957) ; Report of the Com-
mittee on Labor Arbitration, ABA Section of Labor Relations Law 55,
75-6 (1957) ; Note, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 16l-61 (1959) ; Note, 44 MARQ.
L. REv. 115, 119-20 (1960) ; Note, 46 VA. L. REV. 802, 806-07 (1960) ; Note,
1960 Wis. L. REv. 324, 330. See also cases cited note 122 supra.
I'l See generally, e.g., Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv.
L. REV. 1482, 1483 (1959) ; Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955) ; Sturges, Arbitration - What Is
It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (1960) ; Summers, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 BuFFAWO L. REV. 1
(1952).
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ing and costly.2 77 It has also been argued that the courts
would be flooded with suits by disappointed claimants 27
and would be required to determine very difficult questions
involving the drawing of tenuous lines between the collec-
tive interest and individual procedural rights.279
As to the possibility that a terrible administrative and
intellectual burden would be placed on the courts, the
reality is very much to the contrary. First, once the arbi-
trators or the courts made it clear that intervention is to
be permitted, it will be unnecessary for each potential in-
tervener to go to court to secure his right in the arbitration
proceeding. Second, while there might be more con-
tested awards, the judicial inquiry, under the Steelworkers
Trilogy and its progeny, would not be of a substantive
nature, examining the merits; at most it would involve
consideration of the procedure of the arbitration and the
arbitrator's power under the contract to make the award. 8 °
To the argument that arbitration will become more like
a judicial or some other legalistic institution, insofar as
procedure and form are concerned, the short answer that
might be returned is: So what? It does not necessarily
follow that greater formality will impair the substantive
utility of arbitration. As Professor Williams recently
observed, "[I]t would be a shocking thing indeed in the
modern development of intervention and joinder of parties
in courts if the flexible arbitration process could not make
a like accommodation to the needs of other interested per-
sons."2 '' Surely the courts and the arbitrators are emi-
nently qualified to draw the tenuous procedural lines, if
they are so tenuous, to take account of the conflicts be-
tween legitimate collective interests and individual rights.
To repeat Professor Williams' thought, for it bears repeat-
ing: Conventional legal institutions are not unfamiliar with
intervention and multi-party proceedings that could be
adapted to the arbitration forum.282 Can it be, therefore,
217 See Isaacson, supra note 275, at 187; Note, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 153,
161 (1959) ; Note, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 115, 119-20 (1960) ; Note, 46 VA.
L. REV. 802, 807 (1960).
278 See Note, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 324, 330 (1960); 1957 ABA Section on
Labor Relations Law, supra note 275, at 76 (by implication).
... See Cox, supra note 268, 8 LAB. L.J. at 857 (in a different context);
No'te, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 161 (1959) (by implication); Note, 44
MARQ. L. REV. 115, 119-20 (1960).
210 See notes 117-120, 249-54 &upra and accompanying text.
"I Williams, supra note 267, at 277-78. Citing 2 itBARON & HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 591-604 (Wright ed. 1961).
211 See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 14 (Third-Party Practice), 22 (Inter-
pleader), 23 (Class Actions), 24 (Intervention). As to administrative
proceedings see generally, 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.11 (1958);
2 DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW Ch. 15 (1958); 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW Ch. 22, especially § 22.08 (1958).
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that the fear that arbitration cannot cope with the com-
plexities involved in the introduction of individuals as addi-
tional parties is based upon a belief that arbitration, despite
its utility and institutional adaptability within an endless
variety of systems of industrial self-government, is too
rigid for significant internal adaptation? It is rather to be
expected that arbitration can adapt to individual participa-
tion on an institutional scale and still remain both less
formal and costly, in time and money, than judicial or even
administrative proceedings and remain, as well, a more use-
ful adjudicative forum for industrial private ordering. Fur-
thermore, the problems incident to declaring a right to in-
tervene are not likely to be so great as opponents might
suggest. It can be anticipated that at least union members
will be likely to seek to participate only when "critical job
interests" are at stake. 83 In addition, potential expense to
the individual"4 and the requirement of sufficient interest285
will be limiting factors on wholesale participation. Finally,
it probably will be the comparatively rare case in which
the individual is dissatisfied with his union, its representa-
tion of him, or its resolution of a question in conflict. Nor-
mally the individual will be satisfied with his union's repre-
sentation"s or will be afraid to oppose it.
INTERVENTION IN ARBITRATION - WHO MAY INTERvENE
AND OTHER PROCEDURAL CoNsIDERATIOs
The increase in cost that might result from individual
participation will likely be nominal and could be absorbed
by the collective parties.8 7 If the expense is more sub-
stantial, it could, in appropriate cases, be assessed to the
intervening individuals. 28 The New Jersey Supreme Court,
for example, has ruled that when an individual compels
arbitration, he must pay half the costs unless the arbitrator
finds that his claim is both colorable and substantial and
that the union arbitrarily refused to take his grievance
218 See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
284 See infra notes 287-91 with accompanying text.
215 See infra notes 292-303 with accompanying text.
2I See Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 275, 99 N.W. 2d 132,
138 (1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100 N.W. 2d 317 (1960),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960). Cf. Sherman, supra note 271, at 49
(1949).
217 See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbi-
tration, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 362, 405 (1962); Williams, supra note 267,
at 279.218 See Cox, supra note 268, 69 HAxv. L. REv. alt 652; Report, supra note
10, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 183-84 (1955) ; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 946, 954 n. 53
(1957).
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to arbitration, in which case the union pays his share.28 9
When an individual merely intervenes in arbitration, he
might, likewise, be required to pay both his personal
counsel fees290 and the additional cost of the proceedings
unless the arbitrator finds that his claim was colorable
and substantial or that the union and/or the employer acted
in bad faith, necessitating his personal participation.29'
One advantage to having the potential intervenor run the
risk of bearing the expense is that intervention in practice
will not be likely to be frivolously invoked.
Notice requirements need not be formal and could be
tailored somewhat to meet the needs of the particular type
of case or interest that is involved. An ideal, probably un-
attainable, would be that anyone who has a right to inter-
vene is entitled to notice of the proceedings and/or appro-
priate effort to give such notice must be made. Statement
of the ideal, however, leaves remaining the questions:
What kind of notice? And who should be entitled to
intervene?
As to some parties and circumstances, in which there
clearly should be a right to intervene, personal or actual
notice might be required. There would be little difficulty
in requiring this caliber of notice to a grievant in a dis-
ciplinary discharge case or, for that matter, to any single
grievant. In such circumstances the individual's reason for
seeking intervention would arise from fear that the union
will abuse its power, negligently botch his defense or other-
wise fail to champion his cause properly.292
"Where those fears are well-founded, allowing the
individual separate counsel is imperative if the arbi-
trator is to make a sound decision. If those fears are
not well-founded, to deny the individual counsel of
his choice and force upon him counsel he distrusts,
deprives him of the feeling that he has had a fair hear-
ing. The minor problems of having an additional advo-
cate is not a large price to pay for confidence in the
process. For practical reasons, the right to intervene
ought not depend on proof that the fears are well
219 Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 92-93, 190 A. 2d, 825, 842
(1963). See also, Summers, supra note 287, at 403-04.
290 See Williams, supra note 267, at 279; but see 'Barbash, supra note 267
at his notes 82-3 (Discussing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) ; and Gidelon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
2191 Cf. Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F. 2d 473, 481 (4th Cir.
1951).2 2 1 In re Soto, supra note 272. See also notes 48-54 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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founded, for inquiry into that issue will create added
problems, impose more burdens, and be more disrup-
tive than to allow the individual separate counsel in
those few cases when his fears are great enough to
lead him to bear the costs. 293
There being no significant problems of identifying nor,
normally, of locating these potential intervenors, who
already know at least that proceedings are to take place
sometime, a rule could be established that actual notice
of the proceedings must be given or personal notice sent
for the union to avoid being held prima facie guilty of
bad faith.294
In seniority cases, on the other hand, it would be inap-
propriate to require specific or actual notice to all potential
intervenors. Of course, even in seniority cases one class of
potential intervenors would include the particular griev-
ants, who might have reason to fear that the union will
desert them or otherwise sell them out or fail them in arbi-
tration. As to these named grievants, just as with dis-
chargees, a requirement of actual or personal notice might
not be overly burdensome. But, in seniority grievances,
potential intervenors would also often include workers who
are not grievants but whose seniority might suffer if the
grievants were to prevail.295 It could thus often prove to
be difficult to identify the various interested persons or
groups. Actually the initial task in the identifying process
would normally not be as troublesome as it might at first
seem. While seniority disputes always involve conflicts of
interest between workers or groups of workers, the classes
of workers likely to seek intervention are usually easily
defined. Generally, persons beyond, i.e., before or after,
the disputed range on the seniority list do not care what
the outcome of the grievance will be.29 6 They will not be
directly affected by the outcome and consequently have no
right to intervene and no need for notice. This would
follow even if they might be indirectly affected, for ex-
ample, because of the precedential value that might be at-
tached to the determination.
"The right to intervene need be extended only to
those directly affected by the outcome of the case.
Those who are indirectly affected by the decision as a
21 Summers, supra note 287, at 406; see Williams, supra note 267, at
279-80.
211 See Summers, supra note 287, at 408.
295 See notes 65-8 supra with accompanying text.
210 See Edwards v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 176 F. 2d 755, 759-60 (D.C.
Cir. 1949).
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precedent have no greater claim to being a party to an
arbitration than to any other legal proceeding. Reper-
cussions may reach remote employees, but that does
not make their interest sufficient to require interven-
tion. Indeed, it is the primary concern of the union to
urge these more widespread and remote consequences
before the arbitrator. The need is only that those im-
mediately and tangibly affected by the specific case be
allowed full opportunity to be heard. Though the line
may be hard to define, it is less difficult to draw in
practice." '297
Once the range of individuals who are sufficiently in-
terested is initially identified, however, there remains the
problem of locating the individual potential intervenors
and giving them notice. Especially in the industrial union
context, this task may often prove to be difficult. In a
typical case, for example, there might be thirty individuals,
not actual grievants, who will be directly affected by the
seniority determination. Two of these individuals might be
absent from the job, e.g., on sick leave or on vacation, on
military leave or on leave as union officers, and conse-
quently receive no notice of the arbitration. The twenty-
eight workers who are at work, however, do receive notice
but fail to act. Should the two absent workers have a right
to challenge an award that is rendered without personal
or actual notice of the proceedings to them? An affirma-
tive answer to the question would give the stragglers (or
perhaps even the entire class) a second shot at the dispute
and would unduly interfere with policies favoring finality
of decision. A more appropriate rule would be to provide
that when notice comes to the bulk of a class of potential
intervenors, it constitutes constructive notice to all of its
members. But this solution does not approach the ideal of
requiring personal or actual notice to all who might have
a right to intervene. The question, therefore, that must be
asked is: assuming there is an individual right to inter-
vene, even though the individual is a member of a definable
class, must individual notice be given? This question is,
of course, related to the question, who shall be taken to
be within the class(es) of potential intervenors? Admit-
tedly, the answer to the second question should be only
those individuals who are likely to be directly affected by
the resolution of the grievance. Situations will arise, how-
ever, in which the primary matter to be arbitrated may
involve a grievance to reinstate one worker yet everybody
"I Summers, supra note 287, at 407.
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with less than 20 or 30 years seniority is likely to be affected
at least to the extent of falling back one place on the
seniority roster.2 98 In practice, it will probably not be
difficult to determine whether particular individuals who
seek intervention are affected with sufficient directness.211
It would be a terrific burden, however, if all issues of
sufficient interest had to be resolved by the union in deter-
mining who was entitled to notice.3 00 It might, therefore, be
best to avoid a mechanical rule that personal notice must
be sent or actual notice be received in order to avoid a
prima facie finding of bad faith or having the arbitration
proceedings reopened on subsequent challenge. It might
be more appropriate to provide that the individual's rights
to notice and to intervention are not co-extensive and that
the right to intervene is broader than the right to notice.
So far as single individuals who obviously are potential
intervenors or who, with reasonable effort, should be
known to be interested are concerned, actual notice or
personal notice by mail, etc., could be required;301 as to all
others, and particularly when large classes may be involved,
posting of notice on the bulletin boards, and other such
general publications and the like would be sufficient. 02 If
such parties, whose interest is not apparent, receive notice
they could seek to intervene and have the question of suffi-
cient interest determined, but, after the proceedings have
terminated and particularly after a decision has been ren-
dered, they could not insist that the proceedings be re-
opened nor could they make a full scale judicial challenge
of the merits of the determination. 03 Individual members
"I See, e.g., Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Oar Porters, 316 F. 2d
191 (4th Cir. 1963).
299 See Summers, supra note 287, at 407 (quoted in the text, supra
note 297).
Regarding the example in the text, intervention might normally be
restricted to those who would immediately lose job status. On the
other hand, depending upon the circumstances, all persons who are
likely to lose seniority might have a substantially direct interest in
the grievance even if their job status was not in immedite jeopardy.
There might, for example, be a good possibility that job status would
be affected in the near future because of business retrenching.
00 C. Summers, supra note 287, at 406 (quoted in the text, supra
with note 287).
3o See Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. 2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937);
Summers, supra note 287, at 408.
102 See ibid; Note, 13 STAN L. REv. 161, 165 (1960).
83 Of course, if the individuals bringing the challenge were prevented
from receiving notice or from intervening because of the fraud, malice
or invidious discrimination of the union or both collective parties, the
arbitration proceedings might be set-aside and re-opened on judicial
review or a fair representation suit might be entertained on its merits
by the courts or the National Labor Relations Board.
19641 305
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
of reasonably defined classes, would, of course, be bound
if notice comes, to the bulk of the class.
Two additional procedural matters require brief con-
sideration: First, there might be problems that arise from
the fact that individuals generally are strangers to the
selection of arbitrators, who, consequently, may appear to
be little more than the servants of the collective parties. °4
So far as intervenors are concerned, in the absence of a
showing of improper particular bias, rather than mere in-
stitutional or philosophic bias, they probably should not
be heard to complain. They have no more right to select
the forum or the judge than do intervenors in general
legal proceedings 0 5 On the other hand, arbitration is un-
like many other proceedings in that some of the parties do
select the arbitrator. And it has been argued that, when
individuals seek to compel arbitration, they have a right to
participate in the selection process, even if such participa-
tion requires arrangement of a substitute for a permanent
umpire. 0 6 Perhaps similar provision could be made for in-
dividuals who seek to intervene prior to the commence-
ment of the proceedings. Convenience and order, how-
ever, require that intervenors who come into the middle
of arbitration proceedings should not be permitted to insist
upon the calling of a new arbitrator in the absence of a
strong showing of bias.
The final procedural consideration pertains to situations,
usually involving seniority disputes, in which great num-
bers of individuals may seek to intervene. Representation
problems and other undue complication of the proceedings
could be minimized by drawing upon the procedural device
of the class action. 0 7 Those with sufficient interest to inter-
vene could be represented at the proceedings by division
into a functionally justifiable number of classes. It is en-
tirely likely that the individuals, seeking intervention will,
in any event, have done this themselves.0 '
804 See nlote 264 supra.
801 See Summers, supra note 287, at 405 (by implication) ; cf. Parks v.
IBEW, 314 F. 2d 886, 911-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963)
(and references discussed and cited therein) (discussion of fair hearing
in the context of internal union discipline).
800 Summers, supra note 287, at 402-03; Report, supra note 10, 50 Nw.
U.L. REV. 143, 183-84 (1955).
o7, See, e.g., note 282 supra.
808 Matter of Iroquois Beverage Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 290, 159 N.Y.S. 2d
256 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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COMPELLING ARBITRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN
EARLiER STAGES OF GRIEVANCE DETERMINATION
Any discussion of the right to intervene in arbitration
would be incomplete without at least brief mention of the
outlook for individual participation in other stages of the
administration of collective bargaining agreements. Going
down the line to situations in which a grievance has been
acted upon by the collective parties but neither seeks arbi-
tration, the various doctrinal streams emanating from the
Supreme Court decisions once again portend at least for a
rule that promotes individual participation. If the indi-
vidual is entitled to a final adjudication of the merits of his
claim, before a court or administrative agency if necessary,
the implications of the Court's arbitration decisions support
the view that he should usually be able to invoke arbitra-
tion. In order to promote arbitration and thereby to avoid
external adjudications, which the Court considers gener-
ally unsuited to the collective bargaining context, the Court
has declared that "[A]n order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not suscep-
tible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dis-
pute. ' 30 9 Building upon this judicial attitude, it can be
argued that, in interpreting arbitration clauses when an in-
dividual seeks to invoke the process, the courts should dis-
card the traditional presumption that an individual cannot
compel arbitration unless he can affirmatively demonstrate
that his right to do so arises explicitly from the agree-
ment.31 ° In interpreting the agreement, it should rather be
presumed that aggrieved individuals have a right to compel
arbitration unless clearly waived3 11 or unless the agreement
expressly excludes them. To the extent that arbitration is
the highest stage in the grievance machinery, and with
the risk of applying bootstraps reasoning, the same pre-
sumption might be applied in interpreting the agreement
when determining whether an individual may personally
invoke or participate in the earlier stages of the grievance
procedure.
Under the contract interpretation approach, at least so
far as compelling arbitration and invoking and participat-
ing in the lower stages of the grievance procedure are con-
808 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960).810 As to the traditional presumption, see notes 122-25 supra and ac-
companying text.
81 As to what might constitute sufficient waiver, see Summers, supra
note 287, at 408-09.
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cerned, the collective parties could exclude individuals by
clear and explicit provisions in the collective agreement.
But, if the aggrieved individual possesses the right to chal-
lenge their action and have the merits of his claim adjudi-
cated before a court or an administrative agency, it would
be in the interest of the collective parties not to exclude
him. By permitting him full use of the grievance ma-
chinery they would thereby avoid the possibility of a poten-
tial external review of their collective actions that is even
more searching and certainly more disruptive than arbitra-
tion. Such action or policy might in addition add to sta-
bility in shop or industrial relations by promoting greater
confidence in the collective bargaining processes on the part
of workers. Moreover, if the grievance machinery, includ-
ing arbitration, were available to the aggrieved individual,
on judicial review, all the participating individual could
challenge would be the power of the arbitrator to make the
award and the procedural regularity and fairness of the
proceedings. The merits of the grievance or the correctness
of the determination would not be subject to review. Indi-
viduals who failed to intervene or to invoke the process
would not be able to secure external review unless they
could prove that they were without fault in failing to
employ the internal processes and that the union or
both collective parties were guilty of fraud or other such
misconduct. 12
It is, of course, open for the Supreme Court to go beyond
the contract interpretation approach and accept the argu-
ments based upon section 9(a) of the NLRA and the Rail-
way Labor cases that individuals have nondefeasible rights
to participate in and invoke all phases of the grievance
machinery, including arbitration.81" And this is the position
the Court could find it necessary to take in order to har-
monize its decisions, develop a viable and uniform body
of federal law of collective bargaining relations, and avoid
possible constitutional questions - especially if a contract
interpretation approach fails in the task of consistently and
properly accommodating group and individual needs.
812 See Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 92-94, 190 A. 2d 825,
841-44 (1963).
In the area of internal union discipline, Oongress and the courts have
already established rules dealing with the exhaustion of available remedies
that might prove to be somewhat adaptable to cases involving individual
participation in grievance determinations. See, e.g., Detroy v. American
Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F. 2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1961) ; Parks v. IBEW, 314 F. 2d 886, 924-25 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 976 (1963) (both cases discussing relevant statutory provisions,
judicial decisions and scholarly commentary).
818 See notes 91-106 supra and accompanying tewt.
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CONCLUSION
The proposals that have been drawn here for the future
development of the law in this area run the risk of having
the epithets "bootstraps" and tautology applied to them.
This is truly a danger, for the arguments presented give
the appearance of circularity. The circle is pierced, how-
ever, at the point at which inquiry provides an answer to
the initial question: What rights should individuals have
under the collective bargaining agreement and in the griev-
ance and arbitral processes? The question can only be
answered after intensive socio-legal examination of the col-
lective bargaining processes. And, when an answer is de-
livered all else can be seen to follow, for once it is declared
that the individual should have the right to have his claim
fairly adjudicated before a tribunal at least somewhat
removed from the collective parties, other considerations
come to bear upon the general problem of reconciling group
and individual needs. In order to preserve the essential
private and self-governing character of collective bargain-
ing, it can be argued that it is best to arrange that such
adjudications be conducted within the administrative proc-
esses of collective bargaining, culminating in reasonably
neutral arbitration.
Once these underlying questions have been asked and,
to the extent possible, answered, relevant legal doctrines
must be structured to take account of the social realities
reflected and to govern the institutional forms. But, it is
necessary for the lawyer, in seeking to develop appropriate
legal responses, however, to continuously recognize that the
social conclusions involved may, after all, prove to be in-
valid or incomplete. Consequently, as far as the law is
concerned, especially the law in public realms such as labor
relations, there are no responses that have the character
of even reasonably final answers - there are only ways
of approaching or temporarily solving problems. The social
and legal questions considered here dealt with group-
individual conflict, and particularly as to such questions
there are no final solutions. What has been offered here,
therefore, is intended only as a more or less tentative and
gross blueprint for future development in the light of
present and past experience as viewed through certain
democratic or humane value judgments.
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